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 1 
1 Introduction	  
 
Emotionally, the idea that we should co-operate with the Germans and fight side by side with 
the Germans naturally appears disgusting – how can one forget so quickly? (Storting member 
Svein Nilsen 1950, in Frøland, 2006:501) 
 
Relations between our two countries are excellent. Germany is our most important trading 
partner, and Norway is a major supplier of energy to the German market. Germans eat our 
fish, cook with our gas and visit our fjords, and we drive German cars, admire German hi-tech 
products and explore the world through German gates. (HRH Crown Prince Haakon 
04.06.2004) 
 
As these two quotes show, German-Norwegian relations have gone through some massive 
changes in the 20th century from Germany’s occupation of Norway during the Second World 
War, through years of awkwardness and hostilities, to what today is a close relationship in 
both trade and politics. Norway’s grudge against Germany after the war was generally 
described as particularly strong, and thus demanded extra hard work to alleviate. Today, 
however, the German-Norwegian relationship is so well functioning that in 2000 Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder found it completely natural to tell Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg that “the 
biggest problem in the relationship between our two countries is that there are no problems.” 
(Hannemann 2005, translation mine) How did we get here? The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the development of the bilateral relationship between Norway and Germany in the 
first decades after the Second World War and to identify what factors contributed to this 
development.  
 
By the mid-1950s, Norwegian politicians were forced to realize that ignoring the rising 
economic power of the FRG would be detrimental to the Norwegian economy.  Oslo was thus 
forced to make some adjustments trying to balance the public’s animosity towards Germany 
with the industry’s apparent needs. Frøland describes this as “an awkward political 
challenge”(2006:506). Indeed, the political tension often got in the way of trade and economic 
relations in the post-war years. However, in 1976, Norwegian Minister for Industry Bjartmar 
Gjerde and German Minister for Economics Hans Friedrichs signed an extensive protocol 
stating that Norway and West Germany would cooperate closely especially on natural oil and 
gas – Norway’s most important resource. The protocol was a result of friendly relations and 
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trust. By 1980, World War II animosities seemed almost forgotten and the bilateral 
relationship had normalized. 
 
Frøland distinguishes between functional and political normalization. (1999:184) Here, 
functional normalization is interpreted as the process of achieving cooperation on economic 
and industrial matters as well as trade, whereas political normalization is understood as the 
process towards becoming close allies, as Norway and Germany are today. (ibid.) In the case 
of the German-Norwegian relationship we can generally conclude that the functional 
normalization was a much speedier process than the political one. However, I would argue 
that attempting to analyze one without taking the other into consideration would be ill 
advised. For this reason, the research question of this thesis is a fairly wide one, as it aims to 
give a more complete picture of the reconciliation process between Norway and West 
Germany.   
 
1.1 Research	  question	  
 
The enormous change in the political relationship as well as the expanding trade relationship 
between Norway and the FRG from immediately after the war until 1980 clearly shows that 
an extensive reconciliation process has taken place. When one considers the massive 
challenges the Norwegian-German relationship was faced with as a result of World War II, 
this reconciliation process becomes an interesting topic for further research. The aim of this 
thesis is therefore to analyze the Norwegian-German relationship and how and why it 
changed from one of bitter mistrust to close cooperation. What were the interests of those 
involved in this process? This objective can be summed up with the following research 
question:  
 
What factors contributed to the reconciliation process between Norway and West Germany 
after World War Two?  
 
In addition, I will examine how my findings fit within the existing literature, which will be 
presented in chapter 1.4.  
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As the topic of this thesis is such an extensive one, it is necessary to apply certain parameters 
to the research. The focus will therefore mainly be on state actors in the two countries, namely 
the governments in Oslo and Bonn. As those industries dealt with in those parts of the thesis 
which analyzes the economic aspect of the German-Norwegian relationship were so vital to 
the national economies, I am assuming that the interests of the governments and of these 
companies are fairly uniform. This does not mean that private companies and actors will not 
be discussed where appropriate, and one cannot disregard the influence of private companies 
on the reconciliation process. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Furthermore, the time period examined here is limited to the years between 1950 and 1980. 
Anything before this time will be described in the background chapter. The FRG was not 
established until 1949. 1950 thus seems like a logical starting point. By 1980, trade between 
the two countries had reached new heights, and the political relationship saw little to no 
friction. This thesis will therefore not discuss the German-Norwegian relationship past this 
point in time.  
 
As mentioned, I will place my findings within the existing literature. Previous research will be 
consulted and used in place of a theoretical framework. As very little has previously been 
written on this subject from a German perspective, empirical research in German archives is 
needed in order to create a balanced account of the issue.  
 
1.2 Justification	  of	  the	  study	  
 
Germany is a massive player not just in Europe but in the world, and it is also Norway’s main 
trade partner and ally. A thorough understanding of Norwegian-German bilateral relations and 
the underlying interests is therefore especially important. At the same time, Norwegian 
interest in our shared history as well as the German language is decreasing among young 
students. Norwegian businesses, on their hand, are in dire need of workers who know and 
understand German and Germany. (Lohne 2015) A comprehensive insight into and analysis 
of what has formed the bilateral relationship is therefore especially relevant. 
 
This thesis is justified first and foremost by the lack of existing literature. In general, the 
literature concerned with describing the German-Norwegian relationship focuses mostly on 
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Norway’s point of view, and there is an overwhelming focus on defense- and security policy. 
This thesis aims to clarify West Germany’s motivations, as well as to give a comprehensive 
explanation to the reconciliation process and the factors which were instrumental in it. Much 
of the existing literature has an overwhelming focus on Willy Brandt’s positive impact on the 
German-Norwegian relationship. This thesis does not dispute Brandt’s importance, but aims 
to give a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the reconciliation process which shows 
that today’s close bilateral relationship is based on and exists because of historical ties, 
economic dependencies and personal connections.  
 
1.3 Method	  and	  sources	  
 
As mentioned, the aim of this thesis has been to discover which factors have contributed to 
the improvement of the German-Norwegian relationship. In order to achieve this goal, a 
historical method of approach has been used in order to provide a qualitative analysis of the 
German-Norwegian bilateral relationship in the time period 1950-1980. According to Denzin 
and Lincoln (2005:10), a qualitative analysis entails highlighting processes and meaning that 
cannot be measured in quantity or frequency. It was a clear choice for this thesis as it goes 
further than a quantitative analysis in enabling a discussion regarding motives and thought 
processes. This has been especially valuable considering some of the political motives this 
thesis will discuss and interpret.  
 
It is crucial that such interpretations happen within an established context. In the case of this 
thesis, context has held two different meanings. Firstly, when considering the economic 
factors, the political context has always had to be taken into consideration, and vice versa. 
Secondly, the factors identified have all been considered in the context of the existing 
literature, which will be further presented and discussed in chapter 1.4.  
 
The data for this thesis has been collected in three ways. Firstly, it needs to be pointed out that 
as a supplement to the qualitative analysis, quantitative data has been retrieved and analyzed. 
This has been necessary for the chapters which deal with economic factors, and the data has 
been collected from SSB, Statistisches Bundesamt, and the Statistisches Jahrbuch für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Currency info and exchange rates have been retrieved from the 
European Central Bank. Secondly, especially considering the Norwegian perspective, 
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extensive research within the existing literature has been made. In addition, documents such 
as speeches held by Norwegian politicians and transcripts of meetings in the Norwegian 
Storting have been read and analyzed.  
 
Thirdly, due to holes in the literature concerning the German point of view it has been 
necessary to access two political archives in order to make a balanced account of events. 
These archival sources have been accessed at the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz Endarchiv and at 
the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt (PAAA) in Berlin. Among the sources are 
political reports, statistics and personal correspondence as well as transcripts of bilateral 
meetings and interviews. The PAAA stores the files of the German Foreign Ministry and has 
therefore provided me with documents concerning contact with the Norwegian government as 
well as communication between the consulates and the Embassy in Norway and the Foreign 
Ministry in Bonn. These have been especially helpful regarding insight in political factors. In 
the archive in Koblenz I have consulted the archive of the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, as 
this archive includes communication and reports regarding the German-Norwegian trade 
relationship and has therefore been helpful when analyzing the economic aspects of the 
bilateral relations. 
 
Archival primary sources give the advantage of being less edited than other types of sources, 
thus freeing the researcher from the interpretation of others. At the same time, archival 
research requires a firm grasp on the context in which the documents were written, and the 
researcher needs to be aware of his or her own bias. Secondary sources, if chosen carefully, 
therefore have the benefit of already containing all necessary information. With this thesis the 
knowledge and editing of others has been instrumental as the thesis covers such a long period 
of time and so many different factors. The archival research has been used as a way of 
supplementing, discussing and assessing the accuracy of the existing literature. 
 
The most challenging aspect of the historical research method which has been applied to this 
thesis is the critical evaluation and analysis of the evidence. In the case of this thesis, 
language has made this especially demanding, as most archival sources have been written in 
German which is not my mother tongue. Further, when critically evaluating the evidence as in 
stage 3, both international and national context must be taken into account. As mentioned, 
with such a wide subject as the German-Norwegian bilateral relationship, this context is 
incredibly complex and one must recognize the possibility of overlooking an important factor. 
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Further, it is important to note that even though the historical method seeks to minimize 
biases, the potential for biased analysis still exists. This can especially happen when the 
access to data is limited. (Golder 2000:161) In order to avoid such pitfalls, numerous books 
and articles on a vast array of subjects have been consulted continuously throughout the 
research process. In addition, I have consulted fluent German speakers in order to ensure the 
accuracy of translations from German to English. 
 
1.4 Previous	  research	  	  
 
As already stated, one of the aims of this thesis is to place the findings within the existing 
literature. In order to do so, an account of the main arguments and tendencies in this literature 
needs to be established. There are two main points to be made regarding the existing 
literature. Firstly, that the subject of West Germany in the years after World War II is widely 
described and analyzed, also from a Norwegian perspective, and secondly that even though 
much is written on the German-Norwegian relationship from a Norwegian point of view, the 
German literature barely if at all mentions Norway.  
 
The subject of West Germany’s economic and political rehabilitation after World War II is 
one which is widely described and analyzed in a vast array of books and articles. These can, 
roughly speaking, be split into two main groups: those dealing with the economic recovery, 
and those about the political rehabilitation. In the literature which examines the economical 
aspect, the focus is mainly kept on the establishment of and continuous success of ‘the 
German Model’, i.e. a cooperative (or “corporatist”) approach to industrial modernization. 
Hence, it is mostly focused on domestic economic policies. Werner Abelshauser is one 
example of an author who has written a comprehensive work of German economic history: 
Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart thoroughly discusses all aspects 
of the German economy. However, Abelshauser also focuses mainly on domestic policies. 
Norway is not mentioned at all. 
 
The politically and historically themed literature that has been consulted for this thesis can be 
split into three different categories: that dealing with West Germany and its relations with 
Western Europe, i.e. European Integration literature, that which centers around the FRG’s 
relationship or lack thereof with the Eastern Bloc during the cold war, and finally the strand 
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of books and articles that have shown how West Germany dealt with the aftermath of World 
War Two as their topic: i.e. the Nuremberg trial and acceptance of public guilt. These works 
all provide useful context but none touch specifically on the Norwegian-German relationship. 
The main idea to take away from these works is that the West German leadership, especially 
Konrad Adenauer, chose to focus on Western Europe and the European integration project in 
order to regain trust in the international community. With Willy Brandt in the late 1960s and 
onwards, times had changed slightly and the world was more open to a policy of 
communication with the eastern bloc. The consequences of the War have been an element 
with strong influence on German foreign policy throughout. 
 
As mentioned, German literature or literature that focus on Germany does not mention 
Norway much, if at all. The reason for this is fairly obvious: compared to powerful European 
states such as France or Great Britain, Norway is and was both small and insignificant in 
comparison. To Norway, on the other hand, Germany has always been of the utmost 
importance. It is therefore not surprising that a fair amount of literature concerning the 
German-Norwegian relationship seen from a Norwegian perspective exists. Hans Otto 
Frøland is perhaps the scholar who has explored the German-Norwegian relationship after 
World War Two the most.  His focus is mainly on the political relationship, and he especially 
put emphasis on Norwegian distrust of West Germany that most notably manifested itself in 
NATO, where the FRG was discriminated against until the 1980s. However, a functional 
normalization was achieved long before the political atmosphere had warmed up. Frøland 
argues that this was because of Norwegian dependency on the West German 
Wirtschaftswunder. The political and diplomatic relationship did not, according to Frøland, 
change until Willy Brandt became German Foreign Minister in 1966. Brandt was widely 
respected and liked in Norway, and the government there felt more comfortable dealing with 
the FRG after he came into office. 
 
This conclusion is generally agreed upon in all literature on the subject. With the exception of 
Robin M. Allers, who has written his doctoral thesis about Brandt’s special relationship with 
Norway, the scholars who have dealt with the subject are Norwegian and write from a 
Norwegian perspective. In addition to Brandt’s personal connections with Norway, his Neue 
Ostpolitik is especially emphasized as a factor which contributed to increase Norwegian trust 
in the FRG. The general impression is that most scholars have chosen to focus almost solely 
on Brandt and his contributions. 
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In addition to scholarly articles and books, such as those by Frøland and Allers, a few edited 
volumes on the subject of Norwegian-German relations exist, the newest of which is called 
Norsk-tyske forbindelser gjennom hundre år. Ikke bare laks og pølser. This book is edited by 
Fauke Stuhl and contains a vast array of shorter pieces describing close to all aspects of the 
Norwegian-German relationship written by numerous scholars and experts. Another such 
book is 1949-1989: Norsk-tyske forbindelser 40 år, edited by M.A. Moscovici. Both of these 
works have in common that they are thorough in their choice of topics, but that they provide 
little analysis and serve more as a type of encyclopedia than a comprehensive work. They do 
however to some degree contain articles written by Germans as well as Norwegians. 
 
On the whole, however, little to no German literature concerning the Norwegian-German 
bilateral relationship after 1945 exists. Thus, the German perspective on this topic is sorely 
lacking. Additionally, trade and politics are either portrayed as separate entities or as being 
only vaguely connected. The trade relationship is seen as having had a linear development 
with few to no hurdles. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of all of the most important aspects of 
the Norwegian-German relationship does not exist.  
1.5 Thesis	  outline	  
 
In order to provide background and context, the next chapter will provide a brief overview of 
the history of the German-Norwegian bilateral relationship in the first half of the twentieth 
century. It describes how the two nations have a long shared history of friendship and 
economic cooperation. However, World War II put an abrupt end to this relatively warm 
relationship. At the same time, it is worthwhile to note that many projects such as factories, 
railways and even airports that since have been important to Norwegian industry were built 
during the occupation. 
 
The main part of this thesis is split into two chapters. Chapter 3 deals with the time period 
1950-1965, and chapter 4 with 1966-1980. This division has been made because of the very 
clear change in the political relationship that happened when Willy Brandt was made Foreign 
Minister in 1966. There seems to be a clear before and after. Both chapters are fairly 
chronological in order to create a narrative that is easy to follow, but they are also split into 
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two subchapters each, one that discusses the economic and one concerning the political 
relationship. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the first phase of the post- World War II relations between Norway and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (the FRG): 1950-1965. In the early 1950s, Oslo faced the 
challenge of balancing Norwegian economical dependency on the FRG with the particularly 
strong sense of distrust towards Germany that existed both in the general public and in the 
government itself. The chapter argues that even though the trade relationship had a positive 
development in this time period, it was negatively influenced by diplomatic difficulties. This, 
in turn, served as a motivational factor for both Germans and Norwegians to make sure the 
political relationship improved.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the changes that happened when Willy Brandt became first Foreign 
Minister, then Chancellor of the FRG in the late 1960s. The political atmosphere became 
much friendlier and cooperation easier. The chapter argues that this change also had a positive 
effect on the trade relationship, as seen with the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol: it is difficult to 
imagine such an extensive cooperation happening had the Ministers responsible not gotten 
along well. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of shared values and respect for each other to 
the bilateral relationship between Norway and the FRG. Further, it discusses the impact of the 
findings of oil in Norwegian waters. 
 
Chapter 5 will summarize and further the analysis. It is structured thematically into two parts: 
the first will analyze the economic factors which have influenced the Norwegian-German 
reconciliation process. The second part will summarize what political factors and motives that 
lay the reconciliation.   
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2 Background:	  The	  Norwegian-­‐German	  relationship	  in	  the	  first	  half	  
of	  the	  20th	  century	  
 
2.1 Norway	  and	  Germany	  before	  World	  War	  II	  
 
The German-Norwegian relationship is both an old and historically speaking a predominantly 
friendly one. Kaiser Wilhelm II, for instance, did not only travel to Norway as many as 23 
times, he also contributed financially in the reconstruction of Ålesund after the great city fire 
in 1904, which very nearly obliterated the city completely. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005) 
When, in 1905, the Norwegian government fought to gain recognition as an independent 
nation, German support was especially important. (Jervell 2005:94) The German support 
culminated in the co-signing with France, Russia, and the UK, of an agreement which made 
them all guarantors of Norway’s sovereignty. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005)  
 
From an economic standpoint, Germany became extremely important to Norway in the early 
1900s. Germany was becoming a leading nation in both politics and industry, and had an 
especially impressive track record within science– the number of German Nobel price 
winners in the fields of medicine, physics and chemistry was remarkable. (Nerheim 2005:1) 
In the early 1900s, the German economy was blooming, but so was the Norwegian one: from 
1902 to 1920, the Norwegian GDP per capita increased with about 2 per cent every year. The 
main reason for this development was the expansion of hydroelectricity. This was done 
mainly with the help of imported capital and technology. (ibid) A consequence of the 
increased GDP was that Norwegian citizens had more money to spend, and as German 
companies were known for producing high quality items, companies like Siemens and AEG 
saw an impressive increase in demand from Norwegian customers. So much so, in fact, that 
both companies decided to establish subsidiary companies in Norway. (ibid) It thus becomes 
evident that German companies saw value in the Norwegian market even though it was a 
relatively small one. To Norway, on the other hand, Germany was exceptionally important: 
Germany was considered Norway’s most important trade partner as early as 1905. Norway 
imported approximately 87 million NOK worth of goods from Germany at the time, and 
Germany was the second largest export market only surpassed by Great Britain.  
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Another important aspect of the German-Norwegian relationship at the time was the exchange 
of art and ideas. Culturally, the two nations have always been especially close, and it was 
especially important for Norwegian artists to spend time in Germany. Kjell Bækkelund 
(1990:227) notes that the general consensus was that if “a Norwegian artist were to learn 
anything, he or she had to go to Germany. And if a Norwegian artist were to be successful (...) 
he or she had to go to Germany.” (translation mine) For this reason, artists such as composer 
Edvard Grieg went to receive his education in Leipzig, and the Germans, too, learned from 
their Norwegian students. (ibid.) Henrik Ibsen’s “Peer Gynt” was the play most frequently 
played on the German theatre stage in the 1920s, and Edvard Munch was also especially 
popular.  
 
In addition to artistic exchanges, it was also popular for Norwegian students – especially 
engineering students- to spend at least a few semesters in Germany. Although some Germans 
raised concerns about the high intake of foreign students as they felt the spots should be filled 
with Germans, the universities were generally united in defending this practice by arguing 
that the students would become great ambassadors for Germany in the future.  There is every 
indication that this indeed was the case in Norway (Simensen, 1999:121), and in the early 
1900s large parts of the Norwegian elite felt a close connection with Germany. (Henningsen 
2005:94) The relationship between Norway and Germany before World War II was, in other 
words, one filled with friendly recognition and an exchange of ideas as well as goods and 
services. As Bækkelund writes: “we have so much in common.” (1990:229, translation mine) 
These close ties became especially evident in the time leading up to the Second World War, 
when numerous German artists as well as scholars fled to Norway. Among these were notably 
author Max Tau and mathematician Werner Romberg who both became expats in Norway in 
1938, and of course would-be Chancellor Willy Brandt. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005)  
 
The 20th century, however, brought two world wars, and in spite of close ties and similarities 
Norway and Germany were not on the same side in either of them. In World War I, Norway 
had status as a “neutral ally” and stood firmly with Great Britain. New agreements on 
cooperation and trade were negotiated and came in to force as soon as the war was over, 
though. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005) In 1940, however, the Norwegian wish to remain 
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neutral was blatantly ignored by the German Reich, as “Operation Weserübung” was put into 
action on April 9th and Norway was invaded. 
 
2.2 World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  first	  post-­‐war	  years	  
 
Norway was occupied by Germany from 1940 to 1945, and during this time everything 
German got more attention than ever before. Norwegians who were drawn to Germany got 
every opportunity to indulge their interests. The German occupants made full use of 
unemployed Norwegians and put them to work: several railway lines, power plants and even 
air ports were built, or in the case of several projects that had already been planned and started 
by Norwegian companies or the government, finished. Even though most of the Norwegian 
population was strictly anti-German and resented the occupation, the Norwegian workers 
found it difficult to understand why participating in such work could be bad. They were, after 
all, helping build their country. However, the occupants of course used it all to help Hitler’s 
war machine. (Nerheim 2005:3)  
 
In the years immediately following the end of the war, all things German were shunned in 
Norway. Anti-German sentiments can be characterized as especially strong compared with 
those in other European countries, in spite of the fact that Norway was far from being the 
country that suffered the most economically from the occupation. Several other European 
countries were far worse off. (ibid) Furthermore, several of the German projects were used in 
the rebuilding of Norway, and several German subsidiary companies were now owned by the 
Norwegian state. One example of a project started during the German occupation which was 
to become important to Norwegian industry was major aluminum factory Årdal & Sunndal 
Verk. This factory as well as may other establishments show how German and Norwegian 
interests would sometimes coincide, and also how German influence over Norwegian industry 
is undeniable. That is not to say that being occupied was an advantage to Norway. Between 
the first and the Second World War, Norway and Sweden were economically fairly equal. 
After World War II, Sweden was far ahead of Norway. (ibid) 
 
If Norway suffered economically in the years following the end of the war, Germany had it 
worse: by many, 1945 is dubbed ”hour zero” in Germany as the impact of the war had had 
such a devastating impact on the country and its economy. Extensive bombing of German 
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cities had also led to the need to rebuild state structures. (Silvia 2013:16) The German state no 
longer existed, its cities had been heavily bombed, an estimated one fourth of all homes were 
lost, and the currency was undermined by rampant inflation. Large parts of the German 
population became refugees. The Allies (the Americans, British, French, and Soviets) divided 
Germany into four zones. The American, British, and French zones together made up 
the western two-thirds of Germany, while the Soviet zone comprised the eastern third. Berlin 
was placed under joint four-power authority but was partitioned into four sectors. (Elkins 
23.03.2015) In hour zero, it seemed the powerful Germany of the past and the future seemed 
extremely distant. 
 
Still, the other European states had not forgotten what is referred to as “the German Problem”: 
a fear of the economic and political power of a reunited Germany. The divisions of the Cold 
War meant that a new dimension was added to this – what if Germany experienced a Drang 
nach Osten, and became Communist? Maintaining the east/west division was much preferred 
to this option. As Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange put it in a speech held at the 
Storting: “If a divided Germany is a tragedy, then a Communist Germany would be a 
disaster” (Lange 1952:254, translation mine) For this reason, the establishment of the FRG in 
1949 was supported by Norway, but demilitarization was considered an absolute condition. 
Although the government realized that cooperation would need to happen, this was only 
accepted grudgingly. (Frøland 2006:501) 
 
As this quote shows, anti-German sentiments were especially strong in Norway after the war. 
Former ambassador to Norway, Richard Balken, writes that  
 
I am often asked by German countrymen why people in Norway, 25 years after the end of the 
war, still were not willing to forget. To this (...) there is one clear answer: (...) here, everyone 
knew everyone. There were no anonymous fates. (Bernd 2005:147-149, translation mine)  
 
In the years immediately following the war, therefore, German-Norwegian contact consisted 
almost exclusively of the presence of Norwegian soldiers in the British zone of Berlin. 
(Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005) 
 
What, then, was the attitude of the German public at the time? It is fair to say that the German 
public in general was less concerned with Norway and more concerned with dealing with the 
aftermath domestically. Publicly, the focus was on making amends. One important part of this 
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was the Nuremberg Trial, which began on November 20th 1945, and continued until October 
1st, 1946. It was conducted in four languages, and each of the victor nations had their area of 
responsibility. 12 of 22 Nazi defendants were sentenced to death, 7 to imprisonment, and 3 
were acquitted. (Wright 1947:38-41) The Trial was what some call “a spectacle”, but one with 
a very important task: to tell the truth about what had happened. Up to 85 % of the German 
population read about the trials and, according to reports, agreed with its message. (Karsted 
2008:19) 
 
However, after the initial success of the Nuremberg Trial, the German people went into a state 
of what Susanne Karsted famously dubbed the “collective amnesia”: a period where Hitler 
and his inner circle of Nazi Party members got blamed for it all, and the wish was to “close 
the books and put the past to rest.” (Karstedt 2008:26) German criminal lawyer Jürgen 
Baumann described the German attitude thus:  
 
For years, most German citizens made all possible efforts to forget what happened in twelve 
ill-fated years. They made their gaps in memory systematic, and developed the handling of 
these generous gaps to perfection. That foreign countries neither could nor would forget as 
easily had to be taken note of from time to time, yet did little to disturb the inner-German 
silence. Already the term reconciliation with the past was becoming frowned on. Of collective 
responsibility, a responsibility of the German people (not collective guilt), nobody wanted to 
know. (Burchard 2006:812) 
 
This period of “public amnesia” lasted well into the 1950s and did, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, do little to help the Norwegian-German relationship. As a new decade began, 
Norway and Germany’s previous friendship seemed almost forgotten.  
 
 16 
3 1950-­‐1965:	  A	  rocky	  start	  
 
In the 1950s, it became evident that Norway would benefit from a strong West German 
economy for several reasons. A West Germany that did not supply investment goods was 
reinforcing the dollar problem and slowing the recovery in Norway. (Frøland 2006:499) In 
addition, and perhaps even more importantly, the FRG was a potential major customer for a 
Norway that sought to not just rebuild, but also to expand its economy. Frøland argues that 
“Norway’s bilateral policy was dictated by self-interest and dependency rather than friendship 
and trust” (2006:495), and in the late 1950s to early 1960s this dependency was due to the 
possibilities available for Norwegian industry in the West German market. In spite of wide 
spread distrust, both politicians and those who worked within Norwegian industry realized 
that it was an absolute necessity for Norwegian export products to gain access to West 
German markets, “or else Norwegian businesses face a dark future” as diplomat and 
businessman Søren Chr. Sommerfelt put it in May 1958. (Røhne 1989:41, translation mine) 
For this reason, the Norwegian government was inclined to seek cooperation on matters of 
trade with the FRG. The lack of trust that was ingrained in the Norwegian public as well as 
the politicians, however, made for a slow start and a difficult balancing act for Oslo.  
 
3.1 Trade	  1950-­‐65:	  mutual	  dependency	  
 
3.1.1 Aluminum	  and	  Norway’s	  access	  to	  affordable	  energy/Norway’s	  largest	  competitive	  
advantage	  
 
Statistics from SSB show that Norway’s export in the 1950s to West Germany mostly 
consisted of base metals and ore, as well as fish and agricultural products. Aluminum was 
especially important, as Norway at the time was one of the world’s largest producers of this 
highly versatile metal. However, in comparison to other aluminum producing countries, there 
has been very little capacity for processing it in Norway. The Norwegian aluminum industry 
therefore focused more on export than any other country in Western Europe. (Karlsen 2005:1) 
This coincided nicely with West German needs, as the rapid growth in their economy lead to 
 17 
an increase in demand for aluminum. A lack of access to affordable energy made it 
impossible for the Germans to produce enough themselves. 
 
This was and is an old problem of Germany’s, and an interest in Norwegian resources was 
nothing new. During the occupation, Germany invested large sums in the aluminum industry 
in Norway. However, they never got to harvest the fruits of their labor, and after the war 
ended Norway got ownership of everything and continued to develop the industry well into 
the 1970s. Large parts of - German industry was bombed and destroyed during the war. Thus, 
in the case of aluminum, it seems as though the FRG was more dependent on Norway than 
Norway was on the FRG, as Norway had what Karlsen calls the “largest competitive 
advantage”: access to affordable energy. (2005:1) 
 
On the other hand, Norway sought to expand their aluminum industry and in order to do so 
funds were needed.  In this endeavor, West Germany was considered especially important. 
(Røhne 1989:40) So much so, in fact, that an ambitious aluminum smelting program was 
launched by the Norwegian government in the late 1950s almost solely based on the 
assumption that the FRG would be a major customer. (Frøland 2006:504) And so it was: in 
1962 about half of the FRG’s aluminum use was imported, mainly from Norway and North 
America. (Bernd 2005)  
 
3.1.2 Coal:	  the	  backbone	  of	  German	  industry	  
 
Aluminum, however, was not the only commodity. For instance, Norway also exported coal 
from Spitsbergen to the FRG. Coal had been the backbone of German energy production both 
in Hitler’s Germany and in the 1950s. Parallel with the increased coal production in the 1950s 
the import of oil increased too, and oil became cheaper and more popular. Between 1950 and 
1970 the FRG became the country in Western Europe with the highest increase in oil 
consumption. (Nerheim 2005:3) This was mostly due to the fact that the prices of oil 
decreased dramatically. For example, the price of fuel oil in 1957 was 242 Deutsche Mark 
(DM) per ton. In 1960, the same amount cost 125 DM. (Pohl 2001:234) The change in cost 
naturally had an impact on the mining industry in the FRG. In the Ruhr area, the number of 
coal mine workers sank from 443 661 to 167 466 between 1958 and 1970. (ibid) Thus, the 
import of coal from Spitsbergen became the subject of some discussion. In 1961, though, the 
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leader of the German delegation could happily tell the Norwegians that “the Federal Republic 
has, in spite of significant provision difficulties in the German coal mines, because of the 
traditional German-Norwegian trade relationship, found a way to uphold our deal on import 
of Spitsbergen coal.” (Report on negotiations with Norway regarding trade protocols, Dr. 
Volpp, 21.09.1961, Koblenz Endarchiv B 102/263946, translation mine)  
 
What this letter does not mention is that at the time, imported coal was cheaper than the coal 
the FRG produced domestically. (Pohl 2001:234) Furthermore, Norwegian coal was fairly 
cheap. In 1960, a ton of American coal cost 15,25 dollars whereas a ton of Norwegian coal 
was significantly more affordable at $9,6 per ton. (Current prices. SSB 2005, Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 1961) Although oil and gas became increasingly important to Germany after World 
War II, coal kept a central position. A clear indicator of coal’s significance is the fact that in 
2014, coal produced 43% of German electricity. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015) The 
importance of coal and coal import makes it unlikely that the Germans decided to keep 
importing Spitsbergen coal merely as a friendly gesture. However, the letter quoted above is 
interesting because it makes it clear that the German delegation found it necessary to put an 
emphasis on the “relationship”, indicating a desire to improve it. Further, it seems as though 
the message to Norway is that this “traditional relationship” clearly benefits Norway, too. 
Hence, Oslo should also wish to honor it. 
 
3.1.3 The	  shipping	  industry	  
 
In other matters it seems as though politics and diplomacy got more in the way of business. 
One example of this is a case in which the shipping industry in Norway had a payments 
problem with German shipyards in the late 1950s. The shipping industry served as the 
backbone of Norwegian trade industry throughout the 1900s, and a restructuring in the 1920s 
and 1930s created the most modern merchant fleet in the world. This meant that it was a 
major military target during World War II, and as a consequence large parts of it had to be 
rebuilt after the war ended. (Ramskjær 2005:2) Immediately after the war, however, the 
government focused on the energy industry rather than shipping. Few Norwegian shipyards 
had the expertise to build new, modern ships, so subcontracting was necessary. Most 
countries were busy rebuilding their own fleets, and the prices increased. As currency 
restrictions added to the cost, most ships in the first post war years were built in Norway.  
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In the early 1950s, however, currency restrictions were slowly eased. As a result, more 
Norwegian ships were built abroad, and in Germany especially. One example of a successful 
partnership here is the cooperation between the German shipyard Blohm & Voss in Hamburg 
that delivered ships to Norwegian ship owner A/S Uglands Rederi in Grimstad. Ugland, in 
turn, transported cars to New York and Baltimore. One of the most popular cars was German 
Volkswagen. (ibid.) Although Ugland did not begin its transport of cars until the 1960s, this 
practice is nevertheless a typical example of how the relationship between West German and 
Norwegian shipping industries is portrayed in the literature as being a friendly and fruitful 
one. Archival sources however reveal that German-Norwegian cooperation in this field got 
off to a rocky start.  
 
A secret report from a meeting held in Berlin 1958 describes how the Norwegians complained 
that a disproportionate burden was put on Norwegian currency reserves due to Germany not 
being able to create reasonable conditions. The Norwegian delegation did, it seems, find it 
unreasonable that they were to carry the entire burden of the difficult financial situation alone. 
It is further made very clear that, from the Norwegian perspective at least, it is “of the utmost 
importance for the future of the German-Norwegian trade relationship that a satisfactory 
solution to this payments problem can be found.” (Protocol of trade negotiations with 
Norway, writer unknown, Berlin 14.05.1958, Koblenz Endarchiv B 102/26394, translation 
mine)  
 
The payments problem is not mentioned in the literature as part of German-Norwegian 
shipping industry relations. It is therefore difficult to ascertain exactly what the issues were 
and how and when they were resolved. However, documents retrieved from the Koblenz 
Endarchiv show that in spite of several promises from the German side, and persistent 
dunning from the Norwegian side, the problem was not solved until well into the 1960s. 
Although not clearly stated in any document, this could be due to diplomatic difficulties. At 
the very least it seems reasonable to assume that such matters would be easier to solve had the 
political relationship been warmer. As such, the situation becomes an example of how a chilly 
political atmosphere and lack of goodwill between two parties can negatively affect their 
economic relationship. This should increase both parties’ interest in improving the political 
relationship. 
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Further, it is worth noting that the Norwegian politicians also put such an emphasis on the 
term ‘relationship’ in this setting. In the case of the Spitsbergen coal, the Germans were eager 
to use it as an example of how a good German-Norwegian relationship would benefit the 
Norwegian economy. As discussed, the Norwegians were clearly aware of this already, but 
still did not hesitate to use the chilly atmosphere to pressure the Germans for a solution to the 
shipping payments issue. Thus, one could argue that both sides used the bilateral relationship 
as a bargaining chip in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
3.1.4 The	  weapons	  industry:	  a	  touchy	  subject	  
 
Considering the long history of partnership and cooperation, to continue this tradition seemed 
natural in spite of the unfriendly atmosphere. According to Røhne (1989), one of the most 
immediate fields in which West Germany seemed a natural trade partner to Norway was the 
weapons industry. This was because of two factors: Firstly, the FRG seemed to be the largest 
potential market for conventional weapons in a time when NATO because of the Cold War 
mostly sought nuclear ones. Secondly, the rearmament led to a highly competent weapons 
industry that Norway could benefit from. The Germans also showed great interest in the 
Norwegian produced torpedo boat NASTY. (Røhne 1989:38-39) Thus, an interest for 
cooperation arose. At the time however, the political relationship was still very chilly, and the 
Norwegian government was not yet prepared to follow up German interest with formal, 
official contact. When, in 1958, German representatives suggested that the Norwegian 
Minister for Industry Sjaastad contact German Defence Minister Strauss, Røhne writes, 
Sjaastad unfortunately “did not have the time at present” for such a meeting. (ibid) 
 
Sjaastad’s reluctance is once again an example of how the Norwegian skepticism towards 
West Germany proved to get in the way of the trade relationship. Military cooperation was an 
especially sensitive issue in Norwegian public opinion. However, the interest for the West 
German market in Norway persisted, and when the Norwegian navy began its Fleet Program 
in 1960, Norway opened negotiations with the FRG about a repurchase agreement. The result 
was an armaments deal which became a reality on December 17th, 1960. (Tysklands 
Ambassade Oslo 2005). Norway bought 15 submarines from the FRG, and in return the FRG 
committed to buying industrial commodities from Norway. Here, Norway did not have any 
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misgivings about establishing the formal contact they had hesitated to make two years prior. 
(Røhne 1989)  
 
This somewhat inconsistent behavior becomes fairly logical when one takes into account what 
Norway’s main objectives with regards to the FRG were at the time. First of all, as already 
mentioned, Norway was in the process of rebuilding and expanding its industry. For such 
expansion, capital, investors and clients were necessary. The fact that Norway agreed to the 
armaments deal can thus be interpreted as the government being somewhat opportunistic, not 
letting political and diplomatic difficulties stand in the way of a lucrative and necessary deal. 
Secondly, as discussed earlier, the FRG was not alone in wanting to achieve a better 
relationship between the two countries. Norwegian state officials were very much aware that 
West Germany would make for a valuable partner, especially because of its economic 
strengths. Developing a trade relationship in this area would therefore make sense. However, 
as the Norwegian public was so mistrusting of Germans, cooperation was nearly impossible. 
This distrust was deeply rooted in Norwegian society. So deeply rooted, in fact, that both 
German and Norwegian state officials feared public opinion when German artillery troops 
were allowed to participate in NATO maneuvers on Norwegian soil for the first time as late as 
in 1988. (Frøland 1999:183) When politicians were that wary of public opinion in 1988, one 
can imagine it as being an enormous hurdle to cooperation in the 1950s and 60s. 
 
Still, the benefits of cooperation with West Germany could not be denied, and it was therefore 
clear that a strategy to achieve détente not only at the official level but also among the public 
was needed.  In 1957, Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange “proclaimed that increased 
West German imports from Norway and capital exports to Norway would contribute 
substantially to eliminating the friction between the two countries.”(Frøland 2006:504) 
Agreeing to purchases such as the one described above could be seen as part of such a 
Norwegian strategy to make a positive contribution to the Norwegian-West German 
relationship through trade.  
 
3.1.5 General	  developments	  of	  the	  German-­‐Norwegian	  trade	  relationship	  
 
Trade did indeed increase throughout the 1950s and 60s. West Germany’s importance to 
Norway increased significantly from 1955 to 1960: In 1955, 14% of Norway’s import came 
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from the FRG, and in 1960 this number had increased to 19,5% (ibid). For exports the 
development is similar, although somewhat smaller: 11,2% of Norway’s export went to the 
FRG in 1955, and in 1960 the FRG accounted for 13,7 %. The same is not, statistically 
speaking, true of Norway’s importance to the FRG. In fact, in 1955 2,2% of West Germany’s 
import and 4,4% of the export was tied to Norway, but in 1960 the statistics show a decline to 
1,8% and 3,9% respectively.  
 
It is however important to keep in mind that the sheer volume of trade is not the only measure 
of importance. As discussed earlier, Norway provided the Federal Republic with metal and 
ore, aluminum especially, and these are commodities which the FRG relied on importing as 
there was no other way to cater to the needs which existed for this type of goods. It is also 
worth keeping in mind that this is a time period in which the West German economy was 
booming. In 1955, the export was at 13 149 mill. Euro and the current account balance +637 
mill. Euro. In 1960, West Germany exported goods for the sum of 24 514 mill euro and the 
current account balance had risen to 2 670 mill euro in their favor. (All numbers in current 
prices.) This is an increase in current account balance of 319%. (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2014) Thus, it is perhaps not so surprising that Norway makes up a smaller part of the import-
export statistics in 1960 than in 1955.  
 
Still, trade between Norway and the FRG was on a steady increase in the 1960s. The two 
countries kept their level of importance to one another, whereas the volume of trade 
increased. As the West German industry sector grew, so did the number of goods Norwegians 
imported from it. “German quality” meant a wide range of commodities: instruments, 
photography equipment, optical products, typewriters, calculators, tool- and printing 
machines. German companies like Zeiss, Agfa, Siemens, Bosch and AEG became 
increasingly popular. In addition, the appetite for German cars was enormous: in some years 
after the end of the restriction on car purchases in 1960 more than half of Norwegian owned 
cars came from Germany. (Nerheim 2005:2) According to SSB, the number of “means of 
transport” imported from the FRG in 1950 was 129. In 1970, it was 50 000. (SSB 2001) 
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3.1.6 The	  Kiel	  ferry:	  a	  private	  actor’s	  influence	  on	  the	  German-­‐Norwegian	  relationship	  
 
One important addition to the exchange of both goods and people was the 1960 opening of the 
first Kiel ferry line. The Kiel ferry has been of great importance to the Norwegian-German 
relationship first of all because it made it so much easier to transport both people and goods 
between the two countries. This has of course been of great importance to tourism and 
Norwegian-German relations in general, but also to the exchange of ideas as mentioned in 
chapter 2. In 1961, 1600 Norwegians studied at German universities, and “A whole 
generation of Norwegian academics gets their knowledge from Germany, and they all travel 
with ‘Kronprins Harald’ and ‘Prinsesse Ragnhild.’ (Bakke 2011:15)  
 
Further, the establishment of this ferry line was also of great importance to Germany. After 
World War II, 80% of Kiel lay in ruins, and the allies were threatening to demolish all the 
shipyards to send them somewhere else. The newspapers spoke of Kiel being faced by a 
“catastrophe” and thousands of workers took to the street to demonstrate in a hope that they 
would be able to keep their jobs. Anders Jahre, originally a lawyer from Sandefjord, had 
founded his shipping company in 1922, and saw great potential in Kiel. There, he was “met 
with deep recognition and gratitude” (ibid:21) and helped save Kiel from its downfall by 
helping rebuild the harbor as well as bringing tourists to the city.  In its first year, MS 
Kronprins Harald transported 54 212 passengers and 8 286 cars. Five years later, the numbers 
had doubled and MS Prinsesse Ragnhild was bought and put into operation. (ibid)  
 
The Kiel ferry, which is the only direct ferry connection between Germany and Norway, thus 
becomes an example of how a private actor can have a major influence on the bilateral 
relationship between two countries. Jahre, who originally was in the tank ship business, was 
motivated to expand and change his business by a price fall on tank ships. As a private actor, 
he was also freer to be opportunistic and make decisions without considering public opinion, 
which is perhaps why the Norwegian government did not establish this ferry line. In 
Denmark, for instance, the ferry line to Germany was government owned. (Stampehl 2005) 
Another explanation could be that the government simply chose to prioritize differently. 
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3.2 The	  political	  situation	  1950-­‐65:	  keeping	  a	  distance	  
3.2.1 Norway’s	  “awkward	  political	  challenge”	  
 
There can be little doubt that the political situation meant a great deal to the Norwegian-
German trade relationship in the 1950s and 60s. As the examples of Spitsbergen coal and 
shipyard payments issues as well as the case of the troubles with weapons trade discussed 
earlier show, politics and diplomacy can get in the way of a healthy economic relationship. 
This situation was not ideal for either of the countries. In a speech held at the Storting in 
1952, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange made it clear that Norway would have to deal with the 
realities of Germany’s potential:  
 
(…)We have to face the reality: even in Germany’s current state of division the Federal Republic is a 
state which will compete at the same level as all other states in Western Europe. This is due to the 
country’s population, its considerable productive resources, its highly developed industry, and the 
German public’s well known skillset.” (Lange 1952:247, translation mine) 
 
As discussed earlier, Germany had always been important to Norway in terms of trade, and 
Norwegian politicians had to acknowledge that regardless of how the public felt about it, 
Norway depended on the “Wirtschaftwunder”. Oslo was thus faced with “an awkward 
political challenge”: how to balance Norwegian dependency on the Federal Republic with 
domestic distrust. (Frøland 2006:504-506) This distrust was made clear with incidences such 
as the one that occurred when a visit from the German NATO general Hans Speidel to Oslo in 
1957 was heavily protested, as described in the New York Times: “On one of his inspection 
tours in Oslo, buses and street cars were stopped for two minutes in protest, and 
demonstrators at an airport held banners saying, ''We have forgiven the German people but 
not Hitler's generals.''” (Berger 1984) Speidel, although never a member of the Nazi Party, 
served under Rommel in the war. He was, however, forgiven and awarded his post in NATO 
because he partook in a plot to kill Hitler, and did therefore perhaps not deserve this 
animosity from the Norwegian demonstrators. The fact that his visit was still met with protest 
shows how strong and, at times, blind, the Norwegian public’s dislike of Germany was at the 
time. 
 
It seems as though Norwegian media contributed to maintaining this hostile environment. A 
letter from the German ambassador to the Auswärtiges Amt in 1955 discussing several 
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articles published in Norwegian newspapers concerning Germany’s handling of post-war 
issues, expresses concern at how the Norwegian public perceived Germany at the time, noting 
that the newspapers helped sustain the negativity. The ambassador notes that the newspapers 
in question are read by many and thus help shape how Norwegians view Germany. Even 
though the facts presented in the articles are correct, the headlines especially have a “sobering 
effect”, and the overall impression is that “Unfortunately these articles present an inaccurate 
and misleading representation.”  (Report to the Auswärtiges Amt regarding an article 
published in Dagbladet 30.09.1955, author unknown, PAAA B81/222, translation mine)  
 
In 1960, however, one important step towards reconciliation was made: the question of war 
damages compensation was finally settled. The deal, which was signed in 1959, stated that the 
FRG was to transfer 60 Million Deutsche Mark to the Norwegian state by 1961.1 It was 
accepted by the Norwegian Storting without any problems, but interestingly met more 
opposition in Germany. The German Social democrats (SPD), for instance, felt the amount 
was too low. However, the deal was ratified, and fulfilled its primary objective: it eliminated 
the question of war damages compensation from the political agenda, thus making sure it 
could no longer get in the way of normalizing the Norwegian-German relationship. (Frøland 
2005:2)  
 
However, Norway continued to want to slow the FRG’s growing status in Europe, especially 
as an economic power. As a part of the work to achieve this, the Norwegians refused official 
state visits from West Germany for “emotional, symbolical and realpolitik-reasons” up until 
1965, when Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen finally went on an official visit to Bonn. 
(Frøland 1999:184, Tysklands Ambassade Oslo 2005). Chancellor Erhard was welcomed in 
Oslo the year after, but the atmosphere was “not very cordial.” (Frøland 2006:415, 1999:184)   
 
                                                
1 At the time, this would amount to about 107 million NOK, which was perhaps not a very impressive 
sum. In comparison, Norwegian export at the time had a value of about 6,6 billion NOK.  
2 Before World War II, the Sonderweg was a term which described Germany’s ”special path” to 
success. However, since WWII the connotations has been negative, and the Sonderweg is now more 
used as a term that explains Nazi Germany instead. 
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3.2.2 The	  Cold	  War	  and	  Adenauer’s	  ‘Westintegration’	  
 
As has been established in previous chapters, the Norwegian feeling of mistrust towards West 
Germany was a direct result of World War II. After this war ended, a new one began: the 
Cold War. With its position so close to the Soviet Union, Norway felt especially nervous and 
relied wholly on NATO for support. This dependency meant that Norway felt the need to 
agree with official NATO policy in almost all matters, and a direct consequence was that 
Norway ratified the protocol on the Federal Republic’s accession to NATO in 1954, with 
Oslo noting that even though this decision was made with discomfort, national security had to 
come first. (Frøland 2006:501)  
 
West Germany, on the other hand, was faced with the enormous task of regaining 
sovereignty, as Germany was now ruled over by the allied forces. Regaining status as a 
sovereign state could not be achieved without winning back the trust of the other nations, and 
reuniting the East and West seemed even more difficult. When Konrad Adenauer became the 
first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, one of his central projects was 
to put an end to the Sonderweg2 and firmly anchor the FRG to the West. (Herf 1997:213) 
Consequently the decision was made to focus solely on what one might call the NATO 
countries. This, in Adenauer’s opinion, was the only way to rehabilitate Western Germany. 
Many agree with him. Scholar Peter Merkl, for instance, argues that when West Germany 
became a member of both NATO and the Schuman Plan, “this extraordinary feat of foreign 
policy was possible at the time only by a policy of resolutely ignoring all relationships, from 
hopes of German reunification to making peace, with the states of Eastern Europe.” 
(1975:803)   
 
Adenauer’s wish to rehabilitate the FRG coincided with the need to revive all of Europe, and 
it became clear to both Germany and France that they needed each other. France, lead by Jean 
Monnet and Robert Schuman, initiated the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan in 1950, helped 
by Adenauer. With this, the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC) was founded. 
This signaled that France and Germany were ready to put the past behind them and go forth as 
                                                
2 Before World War II, the Sonderweg was a term which described Germany’s ”special path” to 
success. However, since WWII the connotations has been negative, and the Sonderweg is now more 
used as a term that explains Nazi Germany instead. 
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allies and friends. (Feldman 1999:340) Adenauer convinced the Schuman Plan’s West 
German opponents by arguing that ”the stronger the Federal Republic of Germany becomes 
(…) the better it will be for Berlin and the German East”. (Dinan 2004:39) In 1957, the Treaty 
of Rome established the European Economic Community and the Euratom (hereafter the 
EEC) and Adenauer later wrote of it: 
 
This friendship is directed against no one within the free world; it will be to the advantage of 
all. Europe can only benefit if the two neighboring countries in the heart of Europe are closely 
united. France and Germany will form a political dam against the advance of Soviet 
Communism which threatens the freedom of us all. (Adenauer 1962:1) 
 
The Germans did, in other words, see the European integration project as a peace project 
which would not only unite France and Germany, but also protect against the Soviet Union. 
 
This project was, many would argue, driven by a universal fear in Europe of the economic 
and political potential of Western Germany (i.e. “the German problem”), perhaps even more 
than a fear of the Soviet Union. The idea was that it would be beneficial for all the western 
European states to tie Germany’s capacities to a European community. Norway, fully aware 
of how a rehabilitated Germany could benefit the Norwegian economy, wanted this to happen 
in a “controlled environment” and did as such not oppose the idea of the EEC. (Røhne 
1989:46) In fact, the Norwegian attitude was rather that the EEC was a fairly good solution to 
at least parts of “the German problem”.  In a speech held at the Norwegian Storting in 1952, 
Foreign Minister Halvard Lange explained that the government thought the Schuman Plan 
provided “the only possible way for West Germany to participate in a way which can be 
accepted by those countries which fear the power and influence of Germany the most.” 
(Lange 1952:247, translation mine) He did, however, also emphasize that the EEC would not 
be enough, and that Norwegian government felt that NATO was necessary if West Germany – 
and later a reunified Germany – was to find its natural place amongst the other western 
democracies. (ibid) 
 
That Oslo approved of the EEC’s existence did not, however, mean that Norwegian 
membership was a goal. Concerns were raised regarding a number of aspects, such as the 
possibilities for smaller countries to influence decision-making within the European 
Community and loss of sovereignty. Furthermore, Norwegian foreign policy at the time was 
focused on Great Britain, and Great Britain did not wish to join. Thus, the Norwegians 
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showed little enthusiasm towards Adenauer’s project and did not seek to participate 
themselves. (ibid) It is worth noting that at the time, the UK was Norway’s second most 
important trade partner after Sweden.  
 
In the 1960s however, the situation changed. The EFTA, a free trade area, was established in 
1960, with Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland as 
members. Norway was content with this deal but Great Britain was not, and subsequently they 
applied for EC membership. The Norwegian government was very unhappy about this move 
towards the continent. The general sense was that it would be ideal to keep EFTA for trade 
and then stick to NATO and the US for security and defense. However, it seems as though the 
fear of being left alone “on the outside” without Britain was a bigger threat than arguments 
about state sovereignty, so in spite of serious misgivings the Norwegian government chose to 
follow the British lead and applied the year after. (Riste 2001:241)  
 
Norway was not the only European country to make foreign policy decisions based on a fear 
of being left out: according to Hellman “all the efforts of the old FRG were ‘devoted to 
avoiding international loneliness’” (1996:3) To the FRG, the reasons for choosing such a 
strategy was motivated by its history and “the delicate positioning of the ‘semi-sovereign’ 
Federal Republic at the center of a divided Europe.”(ibid) Norway, on the other hand, was 
forced to find more powerful allies because of the country’s small size and vulnerable 
position so close to the Soviet Union. As discussed, in the 1950s and early 60s this ally was 
Great Britain.  
 
Adenauer was extremely pleased by the applications for membership made in the 1960s. They 
did, he felt, add to the European Community’s legitimacy, and he proudly proclaimed that 
“that our policy is right is confirmed by the fact that states which had stood aside now seem to 
be prepared to assume the responsibilities (…)” (Adenauer 1962:2) He did, in other words, 
not let the fact that Norway’s application was only made reluctantly faze him. Adenauer had a 
difficult relationship with the British (Williams 2000:294), but managed to put this aside as 
well. French President Charles deGaulle however did not, and vetoed Great Britain’s 
application twice. As a result of this Norway withdrew their application both times. 
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3.2.3 Adenauer’s	  eastern	  policies	  and	  Norwegian	  attitudes	  
 
As previously discussed, Konrad Adenauer saw it as necessary to “ignore all relationships 
(…) with the states of Eastern Europe” in order to rehabilitate the Federal Republic. (Merkl 
1975:803) In the 1950s, Oslo was very much in agreement with this so-called 
Westintegration, and remained loyal to the FRG’s “sole representation claim” in NATO. 
(Frøland 2006:513) This was important to Adenauer: as part of his policy at the time was the 
so-called Hallstein doctrine, which dictated that the FRG would see it as an unfriendly act if 
any nation was to recognize East Germany or maintain a diplomatic relationship with it. 
Norway, perhaps mostly out of loyalty to NATO as a whole rather than the FRG itself, 
honored the Hallstein doctrine throughout the entirety of the Cold War.   
 
However, with the Berlin conflict of 1958-63, Norwegian attitudes towards Adenauer’s 
eastern policies began to become more ambiguous. It became increasingly evident that hard 
headed refusal to recognize the GDR’s existence was not helping matters. The Norwegian 
government preferred a more pragmatic solution to the escalated conflict, and felt that 
completely stonewalling the GDR would lead nowhere. Einar Gerhardsen and his labor party 
government began, very slowly, to indicate a softer attitude to the GDR. Gerhardsen even 
suggested that it might be considered to recognize the GDR as a state – if Sweden did so first. 
(ibid:514) 
 
That never happened, but both Foreign Minister Lange and Prime Minister Gerhardsen 
demonstrated interest in and commitment to solving the east-west problem. However, Lange 
was of a more conservative persuasion and felt more inclined to stick to NATO’s line, 
whereas Gerhardsen wanted to “build bridges” and achieve détente. He expressed frustration 
with the situation, asking: “how long is this supposed to last? For ten, fifteen, or a hundred 
years? (…) We have to realize the unreasonableness in not having an opinion on this at all.” 
(Røhne 1989:42, translation mine) It became increasingly clear that the Oslo would have 
preferred a softer approach to the GDR, one which involved rapprochement. Gerhardsen 
visited Moscow as early as in 1955 in an attempt to create dialogue, and in spite of differences 
of opinion within the government as well as in the international community he stuck with his 
strategy throughout his career. (ibid)   
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It was perhaps this favoring of dialogue which made Konrad Adenauer reach out to the 
Norwegian government in November 1960 and ask Foreign Minister Lange if he would 
contact Moscow and see if they would be willing to go into direct negotiations regarding the 
Berlin question. Lange, however, turned the opportunity down and suggested neutral Sweden 
for the task instead. (ibid:43) This decision is perhaps surprising considering how 
uncomfortable the Norwegian government normally felt about the FRG’s policy towards the 
east. One could argue that it would make sense, then, to assist Adenauer when he made a rare 
attempt to achieve dialogue with the GDR. However, it is important to remember that if Oslo 
felt uneasy about Adenauer’s eastern policies, they felt even less comfortable with their 
shared border with the Soviet Union- the big enemy. National security, therefore, had to come 
before other foreign policy preferences.  
 
Although Norway at no time officially deviated from NATO’s common policy, its 
government did express an increased frustration with Bonn’s official policy. They felt it was 
too rigid, and made this clear on several occasions in the early 1960s. In 1960, the Storting 
representative Finn Moe publicly made a statement regretting Bonn’s stance on the Berlin 
issue, and Halvard Lange, although officially more cautious, advocated on camera a de facto 
recognition of the GDR. (Frøland 2006:514) Thus, it can come as no surprise that Oslo 
communicated fairly frequently with Eastern Bloc politicians. In 1967, Trygve Bratteli spoke 
at the Storting, stating that: “we still do not know how much time it will take to achieve a 
favorable development (…) But we do know that our country has to actively participate to 
make this development happen” (Bratteli 13.10.1967, translation mine). And so Norway did. 
The FRG kept close tabs on any diplomatic developments, and noted that Norway seemed to 
be conducting “positive talks” with both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Especially 
Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek helped these relations, as he spoke Norwegian 
and thus struck the Norwegians as far more sympathetic. (Report from the German 
ambassador to Oslo regarding Norway’s relations to Eastern Bloc politicians 05.08.1968 
PAAA B31 382)  
 
Oslo’s contact with the Eastern Bloc might have meant that the FRG saw a friendship with 
Norway as more valuable than they otherwise would have. Hellmann argues that (West) 
German foreign policy has always been a “sowohl als auch” – policy, meaning that an 
exclusive focus on the West was not necessarily exactly what the FRG wanted. Adenauer’s 
ask for help to achieve dialogue in 1960 clearly shows that although the official focus was on 
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Western Europe, the FRG was also interested in keeping tabs on the East. Cooperation with 
Norway on this issue thus seems fairly favorable. Adenauer’s request is interesting because it 
demonstrates West Germany’s need for allies, also smaller ones such as Norway – it was clear 
at the time that the difficult situation in Berlin especially would not be solved by the FRG 
alone. 
 
3.2.4 Personal	  relationships	  
 
The shared history and exchange of culture and ideas between Germany and Norway in the 
1900s meant that friendships between Germans and Norwegians existed also in 1945. On an 
official level, however, the Norwegian and the West German government did not entertain 
friendly relationships with each other in the 1950s and early 1960s. Norwegian dislike and 
mistrust of Germans was strong: in the post war years, the saying that “only a dead German is 
a good German” got a lot of traction in Norway (Lorentz 2005:1, translation mine), and 
receiving a German education was no longer considered a smart career move. In fact, 
German-educated engineers now struggled to find jobs and an American or British education 
was much preferred. (Nerheim 2005:2) When major Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet’s new 
correspondent to West Germany was preparing to leave for his new home, his editor told him 
not to “trust these Germans too much, and don’t let them fool you.” (Smith 1990:161)   
 
The atmosphere was, in other words, not one which allowed cooperation and dialogue to 
blossom. Norwegian distrust of all German state leaders up until Brandt was undeniable. It 
must, in all fairness, be said that the Norwegians were perhaps not entirely alone: in a 
memorandum to the British Foreign Office General Sir Charles Fergusson wrote of then-
Mayor of Cologne Konrad Adenauer: “he is clever, cunning, a born intriguer and dangerous. I 
suggest that too much reliance should not be placed on him, and that in dealing with him our 
authorities should be on their guard.” (Williams 2000:294)3 For reasons such as his policy of 
attempting to “integrate” second-rate Nazi party members into society as well as his stance on 
Eastern Europe, which was too “hard” for Norwegian norms and values, Adenauer did not 
                                                
3 The British ended up dismissing Adenauer from his position of Mayor and denying him the right to 
work with politics in October 1945, but Adenauer still managed to become Chancellor of the FRG 
four years later. 
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enjoy more – maybe less - trust or friendship in Norway than his successor Ludwig Erhard 
did. When Erhard as the first West German state leader visited Oslo in 1966, the visit took 
place in what Norwegian Foreign Minister John Lyng later described as a “correct but not 
very cordial atmosphere.” (Frøland 2006:415) This observation seems to describe the general 
tendency of German-Norwegian relations at the time. 
 
Dislike of West German Chancellors was perhaps an unjust one: neither Adenauer nor Erhard 
were Nazi supporters. In fact, Adenauer spent twelve years hiding from the Nazis in retreat in 
the Rhineland, something was of great disadvantage to him in at least some respects, as  “the 
fact is that [his] knowledge of countries outside Germany, already limited, had, if anything, 
been further eroded during the isolation (…)” and that this “had served to set his previous 
ignorance into a cast of something close to insularity.” (Williams 2000:294) In addition, 
Adenauer led the way in the period Karstedt calls public amnesia in Germany. He publicly 
asked for a halt of further scrutinizing the past of high-ranking officials and civil servants. 
(Karstedt 2008:26). The combination of these two factors may be what made the Norwegians 
so suspicious of him.  The Norwegian public found it difficult to trust the West German state 
and the people in charge of it. How could one know who had participated in the war, been a 
member of the Nazi party, or otherwise contributed to the atrocities that the Norwegians 
found so difficult to forgive? 
 
As discussed previously, the German representation in Norway was concerned about how the 
FRG was portrayed in Norwegian media. However, it must also be said that it seems as 
though the West Germans did little to help reconcile the two countries in the early 1950s. The 
general impression is that German media showed little sensitivity towards the issues facing 
the Norwegian-German relationship. When Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, as 
the first Norwegian state official since the war, visited Bonn in 1953, the media reported on 
the event in a manner which later has been describes as “pathetic”. For example, an article in 
“Hamburger Anzeiger” falsely called him the Prime Minister and gushed that Norway and 
Germany had a long common history, not mentioning the wartime occupation with not so 
much as a word. Halvard Lange himself commented on this by saying with a note of 
resignation: “I guess we’re all Germans.” (Bohn, Elvert & Lammers 2000:70) If he took such 
experiences with the West German public home with him, it can hardly have inspired warm 
feelings.  
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The first West German ambassador to Norway, Georg von Broich-Oppert, also struggled to 
show enough sensitivity with regards to the German occupation of Norway. Both the 
Government and the Norwegian King met him with cordiality when he first arrived in the 
summer of 1951. Especially the King, according to von Broich-Oppert himself, “promised to 
support him with his difficult task”. (ibid:69) A year later, however, von Broich-Oppert made 
the mistake of telling Associated Press at an interview in Bonn that “we wish to escape from 
the past. The hatred that occurred between Germany and Norway during the war has almost 
vanished. We want Germany to achieve complete equality among the nations.” The time was 
not ready for such a statement. Several speakers in the Norwegian Storting demanded von 
Broich-Oppert’s resignation. (Jervell 2005:96) 
 
In spite of the protests, the Ambassador stayed in Norway until 1956, and it seems he was 
able to redeem himself. In a letter to the owner of the building in Oscarsgate that the Embassy 
was set to move into, her son-in-law wrote: “Dear mother in law… better or finer tenants do 
not exist, and it seems you do not need to fear any changes in the German representation here 
in Norway (…) B-O (ambassador Broich-Oppert) is not just held in high regard by Adenauer, 
he is also much respected here in Norway after his three years here.” (Tysklands ambassade 
Oslo 2008)  
 
Jervell writes that the Embassy’s archive show that it was difficult to set up and go through 
with bilateral meetings in the early years of the West German representation in Norway, 
which also included consulates in all the larger cities. When such meetings did occur, the 
Norwegians only attended half-heartedly. (Jervell 2005:96) However, reports from the 
German Auswärtiges Amt also testify to the hard work to achieve reconciliation of West 
German state officials in both the Embassy and the consulate. In a report sent to the 
Auswärtiges Amt regarding the Consulate in Bergen in the late 1960s, the author describes 
how Norwegian-German relations have become significantly better and that “[this positive 
development] is not just due to the Norwegian government’s willingness to cooperate with us, 
but rather is in large part a result of the hard work of our state officials posted in Norway.” 
(Report regarding the German consulate in Bergen, Herr Wimmers, Bonn, 28.10.1968. PAAA 
B31/382, translation mine) 
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3.3 Missing	  factors,	  lack	  of	  focus	  
 
1950-1965 can in many ways be seen as a period of time in which several important factors 
were missing from the German-Norwegian relationship. When one examines the economic 
and political aspects, it becomes clear that even though both countries clearly had trade 
related motivations to improve the relationship, the chilly atmosphere created several 
difficulties. It seems as though Norwegian politicians lacked the will to fully reconcile with 
Germany, which may be mostly due to the unfavorable public opinion.  
 
Furthermore, Norwegian and German leadership were out of sync. The Norwegian 
government did not approve of Adenauer’s policy towards the eastern bloc and was not 
sufficiently impressed by the EEC. In addition, Norwegian economic interests lay more with 
Great Britain at the time. Even though Oslo clearly saw the potential in West Germany and 
realized the importance of a well functioning trade relationship with the FRG, it seems fair to 
assume that the close ties with Great Britain diverted attention from it. Since the Norwegian 
public felt so negatively about Germany, focusing on the relationship with the British instead 
must have seemed and easier option for the government. 
 
West Germany, on their hand, was naturally preoccupied somewhere else. Granted, Adenauer 
did focus on Western Europe, and was pleased when Norway decided to apply for EEC 
membership, but he had little reason to devote much attention to Norway specifically. There 
is every reason to assume that Norway, to the general German population as well as to 
Adenauer’s administration, was a fairly insignificant country. Hence, the bilateral relationship 
received little attention outside that rewarded to it by German representation in Norway. In 
1966, however, the situation changed, and this will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
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4 1966-­‐1980:	  reconciliation	  and	  cooperation	  
 
The later part of the 1960s brought with it a fairly dramatic change to the bilateral relationship 
between Norway and West Germany. Although certain strides were made in the early 1960s, 
as discussed in chapter 3, the real shift came in 1966, when the FRG changed its government 
from Adenauer’s CDU government to a coalition one. Not long after, Willy Brandt became 
Chancellor. As chapter 4.2. will discuss, this change was of considerable importance to the 
German-Norwegian relationship, not just because of Willy Brandt’s personal relationship to 
Norway but because his government introduced policies and politicians that shared values 
with Oslo. This naturally had a positive impact on the relationship. 
 
The trade relationship, too, really began to blossom in the 1960s. By the 1970s, it had 
expanded to even more sectors and had inspired close cooperation between the two countries. 
As chapter 4.1. will discuss, a prime example of this is the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol, which 
aimed to encourage German-Norwegian cooperation in a vast amount of technical and 
industrial areas. Thus, 1965-80 can be seen as a time in which the German-Norwegian 
relationship really flourished. 
 
4.1 Trade:	  gradual	  expansion	  	  
4.1.1 General	  developments	  
 
In the 1960s and 70s, Norway and the FRG maintained their importance to each other in 
regards to trade. The FRG made up between 10 and 20% of Norway’s import and export, and 
Norway made up between 1 and 4% of the FRG’s export and 1-2% of its import. (SSB 2001, 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2013) There were, in other words, few changes in this aspect. What 
did change to a greater extent however, is the volume of trade, which has greatly expanded 
since the 1950s. The composition also changed somewhat. For instance, Norwegian import of 
German cars was modest in the 1950s and early 60s, but flourished in the later 1960s and 70s. 
(ibid) The increase in import and export between Norway and the FRG happened gradually 
over the years, but Norway had a consistent deficit in the current account throughout. That is, 
more was imported to Norway from the FRG than the other way around.  
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In general, trade and cooperation especially expanded in the 1970s. One example is the 
agricultural sector. Here, reports show, Norwegian export to and import from West Germany 
increased significantly throughout the 1970s: from 106 million Deutsche Mark in 1975 to 200 
million just two years later.  Norway exported mostly fish- and dairy products and imported 
sugar, coffee and other unspecified food products. (Report on the agricultural sector, Bonn 
1978, PAAA 121.629 420/305) It is however noteworthy that the dependence of West 
German industry on the import of metals and ore was seen as a threat to the development of 
German industry. This caused some concern: “without the existence of a German raw material 
industry, the Germans lack the necessary tools to maintain its competitiveness and know-
how,” reads one memorandum to the Minister of Trade (Report regarding cooperation 
between some German and Norwegian entrepreneurs, Ministry for Economy, 09.1978, 
Koblenz Endarchiv B102/288016, translation mine)  
 
In the later parts of the 1970s German import of goods such as non-ferrous metals such as 
nickel and lead from Norway decreased dramatically. (Report on Norwegian-German trade 
relations, Bonn 14.02.1978, PAAA 121.625 420/302) However, reports found in the archives 
show that the West German industry was still dependent on import of several materials, one 
of which was copper. “There are no copper deposits in Germany,” reads a report on the 
subject, which goes on to raise concerns that apart from its own waste, the Bundesrepublik is 
therefore dependent on supply from abroad. This is highly problematic for “[a] country that 
has a limited supply of raw material and a high copper demand like the Bundesrepublik 
“(Memorandum on possible copper trade with Norway, Elkem 06.02.1979, Koblenz 
Endarchivarchiv B102/288016, translation mine) Norway, on the other hand, had at the time a 
fairly marginal production of copper, all of which basically was sold to the FRG. The 
memorandum suggests that “the FRG should consider whether it would be beneficial to 
cooperate with Norway in keeping the mines open, as it is one of very few sources of copper 
in Europe.” (ibid)  
 
One can thus argue that even though the general policy in the FRG was to rely less on imports 
there was a clear understanding that they could never be self-sufficient. The memorandum 
also shows that the FRG saw value in having Norway as a supplier. It seems as though much 
of this value stems from Norway being a European country, which would make sense: as a 
member of the EFTA Norway would be bound to laws which would make it a more 
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accountable trade partner, and the geographical proximity and preexisting traditions would 
mean that the process would go more smoothly and probably also be cheaper.    
 
As the FRG was and is dependent on importing several raw materials in order to feed its 
industry sector especially due to its problems with accessing affordable energy, it seems 
logical that Bonn would focus on maintaining close, well-working relationship with its 
suppliers. As will be discussed in greater detail below, this has also been a case with oil and 
natural gas. It is, further, reasonable to assume that the FRG preferred to not solely rely on 
one country as the supplier of any single material. This, together with the factors mentioned 
above, could help explain why Norway, although not necessarily the biggest or most powerful 
supplier, still played an important part for the FRG and why achieving and then maintaining a 
good relationship would be a priority for Bonn. 
4.1.2 Oil	  and	  gas	  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the FRG became one of the largest oil importers in Europe in the 
1950s and 60s. West German industry therefore became dependent on yet another imported 
source of energy. From 1960 until 1973, the petroleum demand increased continuously 
throughout. (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe 2009:193) The 1970s, 
however, saw two major oil crises, the first one being a result of the Yom Kippur war in 1973. 
OPEC sanctions lead to the oil prices increasing with as much as 400 %. (Nerheim 2005:3) 
 
The oil crises naturally impacted the world economy. While all economies were affected by 
the recession, the policy response and subsequent economic performance differed greatly 
between the advanced industrialized countries. The FRG was among those states that 
managed best to adjust to slower growth, competition from developing countries, and 
financial instability. (Vitols 2005:2) Abelhauser (2011:12, translation mine) writes that this 
was the breakthrough of the so-called “German model”: “Viewed from the outside, the 
German ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ was at first reduced to a combination of luck, German skill and 
hard work. Social market economy was not an export good in the 1950s.” But in the 1960s, he 
argues, the German model received more attention, and when the FRG so successfully 
survived the 1970s, it really became internationally known and respected. (ibid)   
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As part of the process of adapting to the new, post-recession reality, the FRG decided to 
subsidize the coal industry as a result of the oil crisis in order to stimulate it into producing 
more so that the country would not rely as heavily on OPEC oil imports. (Nerheim 2005:3) A 
clear evidence of this is that Africa’s share, which dominated in the early 1970s (Libya was 
the main exporter), today is just above 17%. (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und 
Rohstoffe 2009:193) However, oil maintained its status as the most important source of 
energy to the FRG. Natural gas also increased its importance throughout the 1960s and 70s. 
(ibid) Thus, West Germany showed great interest when oil and natural gas was discovered at 
the Ekofisk-field in Norwegian waters in 1969.  
 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the current account balance between Norway 
and West Germany has always been in the FRG’s favor. The discovery of oil changed that. 
Norwegian business entered a new era as did its relationship with its trade partners. 
Norwegian off shore industry was developed in speedy fashion, helped by foreign 
competence and the increase in oil prices from 1973. European industrial countries were 
worried about their energy supplies and were eager to make good use of Norway’s “black 
gold”. This was especially important for the Norwegian-German trade relationship. Liesen 
argues that the relationship gained a whole new dimension – one which has tied the two 
countries closer together. With larger income due to an increase in export, Norway was now 
able to increase its import from the FRG. The FRG, on the other hand, now got the 
opportunity to import its all-important gas from a country that was low-risk. (1990:279-81) 
Germany relies on import for about 70% of its energy supply, and its largest supplier is 
Russia. Given Russia’s reputation of being somewhat unreliable, it comes as no surprise that 
Germany has been and still is skeptical on relying on Russia too heavily. (Deuse 2014)   
 
The two nations agreed that petroleum would be sent from the Ekofisk field to Germany as 
early as in 1974, a year after the international oil crisis, and in 1977 a gas pipe connected 
Norway to Emden in the FRG (Tysklands Ambassade Oslo). The gas pipe fascilitated an ever 
increasing export of oil and gas from Norway to the FRG, but import from the FRG increased 
too: after the FRG began to buy gas in 1977, they also increased their export to Norway by 
300%. By 1983, 80% of the growth in West German import was due to the delivery of oil and 
gas. (Frøland 2014:4) The graph below clearly shows how Norwegian export of oil and gas to 
the FRG influenced the current account balance in such a way that the FRG became the one 
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with less export to than import from Norway for the first time in the German-Norwegian trade 
relationship. 
 
 
Graph 1. Export to and import from the FRG to Norway in the years 1955 to 1979. (SSB 
2014)  
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4.1.3 The	  Gjerde-­‐Friedrichs	  Protocol	  
 
The discovery of “black gold” in Norwegian waters was naturally a great shock to the system 
and opened up a whole new world of potential. Frøland (2014) writes that the foundation for 
the very prosperous trade with oil and gas was laid by Norwegian Minister of Industry 
Bjartmar Gjerde and Hans Friedrichs, West German Minister of Economy. They both 
authored and signed what is known as the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol in 1976. The protocol 
stemmed from a recognition of mutual usefulness, so to speak: Germany wanted to import oil 
and gas and Norway needed investment of foreign money. (ibid)  However, there is little 
other mention of this protocol in the existing literature, even though the general consensus is 
that it has played a major part in the German-Norwegian trade relationship. Its aim was to 
enhance bilateral cooperation in energy and industry issues.  
 
For such an important document, it is curious that it seems almost impossible to find any 
reference to it in the existing literature. One might be tempted to believe it was made up. 
However, records show that it does exist, and that it was signed on August 19. 1976. In 
addition to this information, the official German record of this merely states that the protocol 
will strengthen industrial and energy cooperation and that it is valid effective immediately. 
Norwegian sources contain the same sparse amount of information. However, in the archives 
of the Auswärtiges Amt, there are also letters and reports regarding the protocol which give a 
more detailed insight into it. 
 
What is particularly interesting about the Gjerde-Friedrichs cooperation is that they went 
much further than just making an agreement on oil and gas. They also made sure to establish a 
committee consisting of representatives for both governments; the industry sector in both 
countries and business organizations. State secretaries Lars Uno Thulin and Detlev Karsten 
Rohwedder4 were heads of the committee, which was tasked with “encouraging contact and 
conversations between the affected industry groups and businesses in order to determine what 
concrete cooperation opportunities exist.” (Thulin and Rohwedder in report to Gjerde and 
Friedrichs, 06.06.1977, PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine)  
                                                
4 Rohwedder was later killed by terrorists in 1991 when he was the head of the ”Treuhand”, the 
organisation which tried to sell the East German state owned industrial assests after the reunification. 
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The work of the committee explored cooperation opportunities in industrial and energy areas 
such electro technical industry, workshop industry, petrochemical industry, engineering, 
aluminum and steel, and many other, and in general ascertained that the right conditions were 
in place. The general tendency after a year of work, which included several meetings between 
businesses and industry leaders, the establishment of a Committee of Contact between the two 
largest industrial associations in the FRG and Norway: Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie (BDI) and Norges Industriforbund (NI), and two meetings of the Gjerde-Friedrichs 
Committee, was that most industry areas had established a substantial amount of contact and 
some had also agreed on several areas of cooperation. In the case of aluminum, plans were 
made to build a common plant in Emden. (ibid.) In a letter to the leader of BDI, Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher expresses how pleased he is that the cooperation is going so 
smoothly. “I would particularly like to commend you for not only investigating industrial 
cooperation, but also our interests in making concrete offers in the energy field. The general 
assurance from the Norwegian side that they will contribute to the German energy supply 
makes your travel a particular success.” (Letter from H.D. Genscher to H.G. Sohl, 
11.01.1977, PAAA 121.627 420/303, translation mine)  
 
The Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol thus succeeded in facilitating closer industrial cooperation 
between Norway and the FRG in several areas. It appears that this was mostly motivated by a 
desire to secure energy supplies. In 1979, a report concluded that when it came to cooperation 
and trade regarding commodities such as “oil, gas, steel, light metals, chemicals, naval 
technology, synthetic substances and the electronics industry,” good results had been 
achieved and were to be seen as a foundation for further work and cooperation. A report from 
this meeting, the author writes that “intensifying this cooperation will demand considerable 
effort from the German side. In spite [of this] it is possible to strengthen the industrial 
cooperation long term,” and that ”the Chancellor has made it clear that he has every intention 
of supporting the development of industrial cooperation between the two countries. (…) The 
Germans emphasized their wish for a continued cooperation over time, and the importance of 
this” (Dr. Philipp in report to Bonn regarding Norwegian-German industry cooperation, 
12.01.1979, PAAA 121.627 420/303, translation mine) 
 
The report by Dr. Philipp clearly states that industrial cooperation with Norway was important 
to the FRG. In a meeting between the Norwegian Ministry of Industry and the German 
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Ministry of Economy in Bonn in 1977, Hans Friedrichs shed some light on the German 
motivations behind the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol. He acknowledged that not all industries 
were happy with, or understood, the political meddling. Many thought it would be better to 
leave it to the businesses to make the connections themselves. He said, however, that as both 
countries, but perhaps especially Norway, had industries which were specializing in difficult 
fields, further incentives were necessary in order to make sure an exchange of ideas and 
knowledge would happen. Furthermore, he placed the cooperation with Norway in the greater 
political context of the European Integration process. In 1970, Greece, Portugal and Spain all 
emerged from dictatorship. They thus became eligible for membership in the EEC. The 
existing members were weary of this possibility and feared the impact a Mediterranean 
enlargement might have on the Community. The feeling in the FRG, Minister Friedrichs 
explained, was therefore that in the lightly event of a southern enlargement and with the 
possibility that this might change the character of the EEC, it was all the more important to 
bridge the gap to the industrial countries of the EFTA even more. (Dr. Streitt: Report on the 
meeting between Hans Friedrichs and Bjartmar Gjerde in Bonn, 06.06.1977, 15.06.1977, 
PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine)   
 
Bundesminister Friedrichs thus clearly showed how closely politics and economy are tied 
together. There seems to be a strong idea that closer economic relationships would also lead 
to closer political relationships. This sentiment echoes that of Halvard Lange in 1957 when he 
“proclaimed that increased West German imports from Norway and capital exports to Norway 
would contribute substantially to eliminating the friction between the two countries.”(Frøland 
2006:504) Although it is important to note that very little friction existed at this point. The 
report of Rohwedder and Thulin did, however, note that in the military and defense sector, 
cooperation depended on “the two countries’ political decisions.” (Thulin and Rohwedder in 
report to Gjerde and Friedrichs, 06.06.1977, PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine) The 
subject of military cooperation, which will be discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter, 
was still a touchy subject in Norway. The FRG was in fact discriminated against by Norway 
in NATO up until 1988. (Frøland 1999:185) 
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4.2 The	  political	  situation	  1966-­‐80:	  shared	  values	  and	  common	  goals	  	  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the bilateral relationship between Norway and FRG in the 1950s 
and early 1960s was a fairly chilly one which at times got in the way of trade and economic 
cooperation. However, the discrimination against the FRG in NATO was actually atypical to 
the bilateral relationship between Norway and West Germany in the late 1960s and 70s.  In 
fact, from about 1966 onwards the atmosphere changed dramatically. Some of the 
groundwork for this shift had no doubt been laid in the years before, but this chapter will 
argue that most of the changes happened as a direct result of the change in West German 
leadership: in 1966, a coalition government under Kiesinger came into office. Here, former 
mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt was Foreign Minister. Brandt had close ties to Norway and 
invoked a trust in the Norwegian public towards the FRG which had not previously existed. 
 
There is general consensus among scholars that Willy Brandt’s rise to power in the FRG is the 
one factor which has contributed the most towards Norwegian-German reconciliation. 
However, this chapter will argue that the situation was more complex, and that other 
politicians as well as personal relationships between other state officials have played 
important roles as well. Further, the political situation and the trade situation clearly 
influenced each other in the time period 1965-80. 
 
4.2.1 Personal	  relationships	  and	  their	  influence	  on	  German-­‐Norwegian	  bilateral	  relations	  
 
It seems evident that the reconciliation process between Norway and the FRG was in large 
part driven forward by individuals who recognized the importance of fostering a friendly and 
productive relationship between the two countries. Among the people who contributed the 
most were Germans who had lived in exile in Norway. Of the approximately 500 000 
refugees that fled Germany after Hitler’s takeover in 1933, only about 1300-2000 came to 
Norway. This was in part due to Norway’s very restricted immigration policy. The German 
refugees were both few and unwelcome. Attitudes changed over time however, and the exiled 
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Germans ended up making a lasting impression on Norway as well as being influenced 
themselves.5 (Lorentz 2005)  
 
The most prominent of these German refugees is undoubtedly Willy Brandt. Brandt came to 
Norway in 1933 as somewhat of a political activist on the far left. In fact, the Norwegian 
government called him a “communist agitator” and attempted to evict him twice. (Lorentz 
2005) Brandt however had powerful friends who protected him, and he formed a close and 
loving relationship with both Norway and the Norwegian people. The Norwegian labor 
movement informed his political opinions, and he describes the meeting with the youth 
movement as “one of the happiest parts of my life. Here, I came together with friends who 
would go on to carry enormous responsibilities for the development of their country.”6 (Myrli 
2013, translation mine)  
 
Even after Brandt went back to Germany and began his political career there, he kept close 
ties with Norway. He spoke Norwegian, was married to Norwegian Rut Brandt, and generally 
had close ties with the Norwegian community. Throughout his time as Chancellor he made a 
point of keeping the Norwegian government up to speed on what he and his government were 
doing. (Hoppenstedt 2005:2)  
 
There is general consensus in the Norwegian literature that Willy Brandt’s appointment as 
Foreign Minister in 1966 in the Kiesinger government and as Chancellor in 1969 has meant a 
great deal to Norwegian-German relations. Especially his Ostpolitik invoked feelings of trust 
in the Norwegian public. (Frøland 2014:3) Foreign correspondent to Bonn, Jon-Hjalmar 
                                                
5 For more on the history of German refugees in Norway, see Lorenz, Einhart et al (red.): Ein sehr 
trübes Kapitel? Hitlerflüchtlinge im nordeuropäischen Exil 1933 bis 1950. Hamburg 1998, and 
Lorenz, Einhart: Exil in Norwegen. Lebensbedingungen und Arbeit deutschsprachiger Flüchtlinge 
1933– 1943. Baden-Baden 1991. 
 
  
6 Brandt has described his relationship with Norway in several of his biographies, however this quote 
is from Brandt (1960): Min vei til Berlin. Oslo, Cappelen forlag. See also: Lorentz, Einhart (1989): 
Willy Brandt i Norge. Eksilåra 1933-1940. Oslo, Tiden Forlag 
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Smith describes Brandt as “crucial” for the détente in the Norwegian-German relationship, 
and explains his wording thusly:  
 
This was not only due to his Norwegian past, but also his consistent attitude at a time when so 
many of his countrymen were actively or passively supporting the Nazi regime. As a 
Norwegian correspondent in Bonn I often tried to convince conservative German friends of 
Brandt’s importance for West German prestige abroad – but it seems I was not completely 
successful. (Smith 1990:161, translation mine) 
 
Conservative Germans might have been unwilling to recognize Brandt’s importance, but from 
the Norwegian point of view it is unmistakable. As discussed in chapter 3, Norwegian distrust 
of all German state leaders up until Brandt was undeniable. Once Brandt came into power, 
though, he wasted little time in visiting Oslo again. This visit, which Lyng recalled in his 
memoir, was “like arriving in a whole new world.” (Frøland 2006:415) This friendly 
atmosphere extended to all branches of the governments it seems, as Frøland writes: “The 
talks between the two foreign ministers, Walter Scheel and Svenn Stray, in 1970 were 
characterized by a trust and mutual cordiality that had not existed in the early 1960s.” 
(2006:516) 
 
Brandt was not the only German to help improve the German-Norwegian relationship. 
Another public figure worth mentioning is author and founder of the German-Norwegian 
Association (Deutsch-Norwegische Gesellschaft) Max Tau. His importance is made clear in a 
letter to the foreign ministry in Bonn. Here, the German ambassador to Norway urges the 
Bundespräsident to follow the advice of Dr. Max Tau and holds a speech at the 10 year 
anniversary of German-Norwegian reconciliation in 1970. The ambassador clearly 
emphasizes the importance of Dr. Tau’s work to achieve a better relationship.  
 
Dr Max Tau, who is held in the highest regard in Norway, has worked harder than anyone else 
for a German-Norwegian reconciliation since the war. As he himself was persecuted by the 
Nazi regime he has been successful in relaxing Norwegian mistrust in Germany. Further, he 
has managed to make several influential Norwegians who used to belong to the resistance 
movement and who have earlier been very reserved interested in German culture.  (Dr. G 
Ritzel: Letter to das Auswärtige Amt regarding the forthcoming visit from the 
Bundespräsident to Oslo, 27.01.1970, PAAA B31/382, translation mine) 
 
As described by the Ambassador, Dr. Tau himself had suffered at the hands of the Nazi 
regime, and fled to Norway in 1938. He spent the war years in Sweden but returned to 
 46 
Norway in 1945, and went on to found the Norwegian-German society, and worked tirelessly 
to improve Norwegians’ regard for German literature especially, but also to improve the 
German-Norwegian relationship in general. As such, he joins a group of highly influential 
Germans who sought refuge in Norway during the war and maintained ties after its end. 
Among these were also renowned psychiatrists Leo Eitinger and Bertold Grünfeld; painter 
Kurt Schwitters and expressionist Rolf Nesch. (Lorentz 2005:1)  
 
The German exiles to Norway were in a unique position to help reconcile the two countries 
after the war ended. As previously discussed, general trust toward Germans was generally 
very low. With the likes of Willy Brandt and Max Tau however, Norwegians felt they could 
be trusted because they were victims of the National Socialism themselves, and because they 
had lived in Norway, had Norwegian friends, and spoke the language. This was, as discussed 
earlier, especially true regarding Willy Brandt. His importance to the shift in the Norwegian 
opinion of Germany is undeniable. Minister of Foreign Affairs John Lyng “(…) stated that 
Norway had felt a `greater trust in West German policies after Willy Brandt, with his past and 
his record under the Nazi regime, became the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.´” (Frøland 
2006:516) 
 
According to Lorentz, their time spent in Norway until 1940 and Sweden after the war broke 
out was important to the German refugees and their future careers as well. He argues that their 
time spent in free societies with humanistic values influenced them and gave terms like 
freedom, justice and solidarity new meaning. Further, there can be little doubt that the small 
size of the Scandinavian countries offered the opportunity to get to know political and cultural 
leaders in a way that was not possible in larger countries. Many friendships were formed 
between people who would go on to hold powerful positions in their home countries. Thus, 
the Germans who were exiled in Norway and Sweden came back to Germany with a different 
kind of experience than other refugees, and a clear advantage especially compared to people 
who had been imprisoned, or who had to hide either in other countries or anonymity. (Lorentz 
2005:1)  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, Konrad Adenauer serves as a good example of someone who might 
have benefitted from exile in Scandinavia, as some would argue that he was held back by his 
time spent in solitude in the Ruhr area. He might have had more allies and friends and favored 
other policies, had he been exiled in Sweden instead. However, Adenauer also shows that 
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such experiences were not a necessity as he did serve as the FRG’s Chancellor for an 
impressive 14 years and was and is extremely well respected. However, Lorentz argues that 
almost immediately following Adenauer’s time in power, the Bundestag was to be dominated 
by politicians who had spent time in Norway and Sweden. (ibid) 
 
With such positive experiences of their time spent in Scandinavia, it seems reasonable to 
assume that Willy Brandt and his fellow expats to Norway brought a higher regard for the 
country home with them. This, in turn, would possibly have contributed to a desire for 
reconciliation that perhaps was stronger than it might have been had they been in exile 
elsewhere. Whereas, as described in chapter 3, the early 1960s showed signs of diplomatic 
difficulties, once Brandt came to office he took charge and instructed the West German 
ambassador to “take active steps to eliminate” lingering Norwegian distrust. (Frøland 
2006:516) It could be argued that friendly sentiments played a part in this commitment to the 
bettering of German-Norwegian relations.   
 
Although Brandt and his government were not the first West German officials to attempt 
reconciliation, it seems clear that there was no big shift in political attitudes in Norway before 
Brandt’s rise to power.  A report from a visit from Justice Minister Josef Neuberger in 1968 
sent to the Auswärtige Amt illustrates how important the new, friendlier atmosphere was to 
the cooperation between the two states, and also how this depended on similarities in values 
and opinion:  The Norwegians were “eager” to show Minister Neuberger the Norwegian 
justice system and also to learn about the West German system from him. “Herr Minister Dr. 
Neuberger delivered a convincing report and awoke sympathy and understanding with his 
liberal and open ideas and attitudes. (…) All in all, the visit of Herr Minister Dr. Neuberger 
represents a victory for the German-Norwegian relationship.” (Report regarding the visit of 
Justice Minister Dr. Dr. Neuberger to Oslo from the German Embassy to the Auswärtige Amt, 
06.08.1968,PAAA B31/382, translation mine)  
 
This new, friendly tone was to become the rule rather than the exception in diplomatic as well 
as economical and industrial dealings after the Cabinet of Willy Brandt came into office.  
Records from the Auswärtige Amt show that from the early 1970s on it was commonplace to 
praise the friendly atmosphere and the positive bilateral relationship, and friendships were 
formed. A telegram from Willy Brandt to Halvard Lange’s wife Aase after her husband’s 
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death illustrates how the ties between the two governments were not strictly professional, but 
in fact a result of actual respect and admiration: 
 
Sehr verehrte, Liebe Frau Lange, the news of Halvard Lange’s death has shaken me deeply. 
Halvard was through our years of working together a friend and an idol to me. We were 
connected through our shared ideas for the political futures of our countries and of Europe. 
(Willy Brandt in telegram to Aase Lange, date unknown, PAAA B31/383, translation mine) 
 
Further friendships, such as the above mentioned one between Ministers Stray and Scheel, are 
also evident in documents from the time and can hardly have been a disadvantage to the 
process of making West Germany “one of Norway’s closest allies.” (Frøland 1999:183) 
Warm relationships, it seems, also formed the basis for the all-important Gjerde-Friedrichs 
protocol. It is, according to Frøland, an example of how a friendship characterized by trust 
helped foster the functional normalization between the two countries.  Indeed, Ministers 
Gjerde and Friedrichs got along well not just when doing business but also in private, as is 
evident in this note from Friedrichs to Gjerde: “My wife and I are very much looking forward 
to seeing you and your wife again here in Germany. We remember with fondness our 
beautiful days together in Norway last August”. (Hans Friedrichs in letter to Bjartmar Gjerde, 
12.05.1977, PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine) Hans Friedrichs was not just a 
member of Brandt’s government (although not an SPD member, Friedrichs belonged to the 
far smaller Freie Demokratische Partei), he was also born in 1931 and therefore too young to 
have been spoiled by Nazism. No doubt this helped increase the level of trust with the 
Norwegians. 
 
4.2.2 The	  “Neue	  Ostpolitik”	  
 
The findings presented in chapter 4.2.1. clearly show that shared values have been particularly 
important to the bilateral relationship between Norway and the FRG. A clear example of this 
is the FRG’s policy towards Eastern Europe: as discussed in chapter 3, Adenauer’s policy of 
ignoring the eastern states made the Norwegian government uneasy. When Willy Brandt 
became Foreign Minister, he also expressed that he did not feel such a rigid attitude was the 
right way to go. When he became Chancellor a few years later, he wasted little time in 
launching his Neue Ostpolitik. He did this with “a dispatch born of years of observing the ups 
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and downs of Soviet-German relations.” (Merkl 1975:811) The Neue Ostpolitik was created 
by Brandt and his Secretary of the Prime Minster’s Office, Egon Bahr.  
 
Bahr had long been aware that the current policy was not working as it should, and as early as 
1963 he held a speech that explained his vision for a new policy thusly: 
 
The first conclusion to be drawn from applying this strategy for peace to Germany is that the 
policy of all-or-nothing must be ruled out. Either free elections or nothing, either all-German 
freedom of choice or an obstinate “no,” either elections as the first step or rejection – all this is 
not only hopelessly antiquated and unreal, but in a strategy of peace it is also meaningless. 
Today it is clear that reunification is not a one-time act that will be put into effect by a historic 
decision on an historic day at an historic conference, but rather a process involving many steps 
and many stations. If what Kennedy said is right, that the interests of the other side also need 
to be recognized and considered, then it is certainly impossible for the Soviet Union to let the 
Eastern Zone be snatched away from it for the purpose of strengthening the West's potential. 
The Zone must be transformed with the approval of the Soviets. (…)This is a policy that can 
be summarized by the formula: change through rapprochement. (Bahr, 15.07.1963) 
 
Willy Brandt, having observed the many problems facing the relationship of the eastern and 
western parts of Germany, agreed with Bahr’s ideas and formulated a policy based on them. It 
is important to keep in mind that although there can be little doubt that Brandt was 
instrumental in this foreign policy change, he was able to make it solely due to his own 
cleverness. Times had changed, and the German people had had more than a decade by now 
to get used to a divided Germany. Brandt was not the first German politician to realize a 
change was needed. His predecessor, Gerhard Schröder7, also sought to reestablish a 
relationship with the Eastern states. Brandt therefore, according to Merkl, “merely undertook 
to complete under more favorable circumstances and in a more effective manner what 
Schroeder had attempted in vain.” (1975:804)  
 
Regardless of the times and circumstances and their influence on it, this change in policy 
towards the East was important to the German-Norwegian relationship for two reasons. 
Firstly, such a dramatic change in policy was a risky move by Germany, as the world still 
feared a German “move towards the East” and thus was sure to be met by a certain level of 
                                                
7 This Gerhard Schröder was born in 1910 and a member of the CDU. He served as Foreign Minister 
for under Adenauer and should not be confused with Gerhard Schröder, the SDP leader who was born 
in 1944 and Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005. 
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resistance and criticism. Hence, Willy Brandt and his government were in need of supporters. 
Norway was an obvious candidate here, as they had already made their sympathies for the 
“change through rapprochement”-idea clear. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Brandt’s Ostpolitik meant that Norwegian trust in 
the FRG increased. It “satisfied Norwegian ideas about bridge-building and détente that 
transcended party boundaries” (Frøland 2006:516) In a meeting between Foreign Ministers 
Walter Scheel and Svenn Stray in 1970, Stray made a point out of recognizing the FRG’s 
efforts to work in a multinational framework when dealing with Eastern Europe, praising a 
recently signed treaty between the FRG and the USSR which focused mainly on the FRG’s 
willingness to accept current national borders and not to attempt in any way to change them – 
a treaty the Norwegian government felt confident would lead to improved relations with 
Eastern Europe and, most importantly: “Foreign Minister Scheel expressed Norway’s 
complete support (from both the government and the opposition) for Germany’s Ostpolitik. 
(…)Norway believes that Germany’s new approach will lead to a general relaxation of 
tensions within Europe.” (Report about meeting between Foreign Ministers Stray and Scheel 
10.09.1970, PAAA B31/382, translation mine)  
 
According to Frøland, this meeting was far friendlier than any meeting in the 1960s. 
(2006:516) It is lightly that the mutual trust and respect exhibited was not just a result of good 
personal chemistry, but that it was just as much due to the fact that the two ministers could 
agree on such an important issue. The change in German policy towards the Eastern bloc thus 
helped better their relationship with Norway and became, like the reparations question, an 
issue which was cleared out of the way and made reconciliation possible.  
 
4.2.3 The	  European	  Community	  and	  EFTA	  
 
Norway and the FRG might have been in close to complete agreement with regards to the 
Ostpolitik, but in the case of European integration the situation was more complicated. 
Whereas the German idea might have been to create peace through cooperation and unity, 
Frøland argues that fear of missing out on the growth in the West German market was one of 
the main motives behind the Norwegian applications for European Community (EC) 
membership during the 1960s. (2006:504-505) This fear, combined with the vigorous 
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following of the British example, shows how economic considerations clearly influenced 
Norwegian policies at the time. As trade with the FRG grew, so did the political motivation to 
work with the Germans to achieve Norwegian membership in the European integration 
process. According to Tamnes, the FRG was to gradually become Norway’s foremost 
European ally from 1965 onwards, especially after the German government change from the 
Christian Democrats of Adenauer to the coalition government of Kiesinger and social 
democrat government of Brandt. (Frøland 1999:185)  
 
This argument is supported by the fact that from about the mid-1960s and onward it is clear 
from documents and reports from bilateral talks between Norway and the FRG that the 
question of Norwegian membership in the EC is among the most talked about subjects. The 
closer the two countries grew, the more important the question it became. In 1979, the 
German embassy noted that “Norwegian interest in an intensified dialogue with the EC has 
grown since the enlargement. [This] correlates with a wish to expand their economic and 
technological cooperation with us.” (note concerning the state visit of Willy Brandt to Oslo, 
12.07.1979., author unknown, PAAA 121.624 420-300, translation mine) This clearly 
indicates economic motives as having a strong influence on the bilateral relationship.  
  
The strong Norwegian interest in the EC was not one-sided. According to the archives, the 
Germans consistently express a wish that Norway will find a way to overcome the issues they 
may have with the European Community, and they also promise to help find solutions to the 
problems Norway had. It was these problems that complicated matters. Although the 
Norwegian government saw the value of EC membership, it was a particularly difficult 
political topic domestically with opposition among both the government and the public. 8 
Willy Brandt was an especially eager campaigner of Norwegian membership and threw 
himself into the battle. Brandt’s involvement was of symbolic value. As Lorentz writes: 
  
                                                
8 Norway struggled not only with the loss of sovereignty, but also with the fish- and agricultural 
sectors, which were unlikely to survive in the liberal European market. These issues meant that parts 
of the Norwegian public was strongly opposed to membership in the EC, and on the two occasions the 
issue has been put to a vote, the referenda are notorious for having caused fights and for splitting 
families.  
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No matter how you personally felt about the question of Norwegian membership in the EC, it 
was impossible to ignore the significance of former NN prisoner Trygve Bratteli and the 
returned immigrant Willy Brandt, both chiefs of governments in their respective countries, on 
the same stage at Youngstorget in Oslo in 1972, proclaiming their vision of a peaceful Europe. 
(Lorentz 2005:1, translation mine) 
 
What prompted this German eagerness to include Norway? Firstly, there is the peace 
perspective. West Germany did, as is widely known, see a united Western Europe as a 
necessity in order to procure peace and protect the western democracies against the Soviet 
Union as well as internal conflict. For this to be a possibility, every Western European 
country should be a member. Secondly, the FRG’s leadership was very conscious of the so-
called “German problem”, and realized that the European Community was a useful tool to 
generate trust towards the German democracy. Only when the trust of the international 
community was regained could one possibly hope for German reunification. 
 
Thirdly, there is the market and trade argument. As has been detailed in chapter 3, West 
Germany and Norway were old trade partners, and a Norwegian membership in the EC would 
no doubt help simplify the business aspect of the relationship. What both of these arguments 
have in common is that they represent the initial intention of the EC: to slowly work towards 
becoming a Federation of Europe, in which war was impossible. From the very beginning, it 
was made clear that the European Community should and must be ”open to the participation 
of the other countries of Europe.” (Schuman 1950)  
 
When answering a question from the SPD about how the German government regarded the 
possible accession of the UK, Denmark and Norway into the EC in 1966, Chancellor 
Kiesinger made it clear that he  
 
and the German government have no doubts that the three European communities are the 
economic foundation of the efforts to further unite Europe. Germany has and will continue to 
support the unification of Europe. (…)Germany is consistently in favor of the entrance of 
“third countries”, (…)The best way to a comprehensive economic union within Europe is 
participation of “third countries” with the EEC through entrance, association or special 
agreements. (…) Germany believes that an expansion of the EEC is vital to creating a 
comprehensive European community. (Suggested answer to question posed by the SPD, 
author unknown, 14.09.1966, PAAA B21/728, translation mine) 
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The German government did, in other words, see it as crucial to the development of the 
European Community that Western European countries joined. It is also interesting to note 
that Kiesinger expresses openness to association and to special agreements, which is what 
Norway ended up with. Even though Norway remained on the outside, the relationship with 
Germany grew stronger throughout the 1970s, and the FRG was soon to be described as 
Norway’s closest ally. Kleppe explains this shift thusly: “The bilateral relationship remains 
strong (…) In addition to all the economic, cultural, political and human bonds that tie the Federal 
Republic and Norway together, we also have common interests regarding Western Europe’s relations 
with the rest of the world. (Kleppe 1990:247, translation mine) 
 
4.3 Shared	  values,	  friendship	  and	  trade	  
 
From the time Willy Brandt and his government won the election in the FRG, the Norwegian-
German relationship has consisted of several factors which did not previously exist. First of 
all, as the entire body of literature on the subject agrees, Willy Brandt brought an enormous 
change to the political atmosphere. This was first of all because of his personal relationship 
with Norway and the respect and trust from the Norwegian government that he enjoyed. 
Brandt thus serves as a clear example of how one single person can strongly influence the 
political atmosphere and bilateral relations.  
 
It is too simplistic, however, to credit Brandt alone with the positive development considered 
in this chapter. As discussed, several other members of government as well as Germans in 
Norway such as Max Tau contributed substantially. There can be little doubt that the 
friendliness that existed between several of the ministers of government in the 1970s 
especially contributed to an atmosphere in which cooperation was easier. Evidently, shared 
values have been of the utmost importance, as the report from Herr Neuberger’s visit to 
shows. Here, it is made clear that the fact that the German minister and the Norwegian 
delegation could discuss common values made Herr Neuberger seem much more sympathetic 
to the Norwegians, and the visit became a good foundation to build on. Brandt’s importance is 
by no means disputed by this thesis, but it is nevertheless important to keep in mind that 
several other personalities contributed, too.  
 
 54 
Furthermore, the FRG and Norway lead increasingly like-minded foreign policies after the 
German government change. Firstly, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik received widespread support 
in Norway, and secondly, the Norwegian government showed more interest in the EC and 
focused to a greater extent on Europe than on Great Britain. As discussed, the British had 
been Norway’s greatest ally for many decades, but after 1965 scholars such as Tamnes would 
argue that West Germany took over this position.  
 
Additionally, trade and economic as well as technical and industrial cooperation must be said 
to have expanded greatly towards the end of the 1960s. Consequently, Norway and West 
Germany developed stronger interests in and dependency on each other. There can be little 
doubt that Norway relied on West Germany as a market to a much greater extent than the 
FRG relied on Norway. However, as previously discussed, Norway had certain advantages as 
an EFTA member with access to resources the FRG needed. Norwegian oil and gas especially 
made a huge impact on the trade relationship, and as the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol shows, 
motivated closer cooperation between the two countries. 
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5 The	  reconciliation	  of	  Norway	  and	  West	  Germany	  1950-­‐80	  
 
The aim of this thesis has been to analyze the Norwegian-German relationship from 1950 to 
1980, to identify which factors contributed to the development of it and to place these 
findings within the existing literature. The two main chapters, 3 and 4, have discussed the 
periods 1950-65 and 1965-80 respectively. This division has happened naturally, as the late 
1960s is when the German-Norwegian relationship first underwent a substantial change. 
 
As mentioned, when one examines the post- World War II decades, it becomes clear that 
there are certain elements which are lacking in 1950-65, but that exist in 1965-80. This makes 
them easier to identify. These elements, or factors, can be split into two main groups: 
economic and political factors. This chapter summarizes and furthers the analysis of these 
factors. It also places the findings within the existing literature. 
 
5.1 Economic	  factors	  
 
The economic relationship between Norway and the FRG is one which is both complex and 
far-reaching. It is interesting how much of Norwegian industry exists at least partly because 
of German influence, be it before, during or after the war. At the same time, Norwegian 
products such as aluminum and coal have been indispensable to the German industry. The 
economic factors that have influenced the German-Norwegian relationship in the years 1950-
1980 are either related to trade, industrial cooperation, or people.  
 
5.1.1 Trade	  
 
Trade is the economic factor which is the easiest to measure with numbers, as it concerns 
import and export. The general tendencies of the German-Norwegian trade relationship is that 
Norway needed the FRG as an export market in order to acquire the capital that was needed to 
not only keep Norwegian industry alive, but to expand it. The FRG, on the other hand, 
suffered under a lack of access to affordable energy and found a favorable supplier of 
important commodities such as aluminum in Norway. Norwegians also imported a number of 
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goods from West Germany, but this was less out of necessity for both countries. All in all, 
however, there seems to have been a certain level of mutual dependency in the German-
Norwegian trade relationship which is typically not discussed in any of the literature on the 
subject.  
 
Findings presented in this thesis support this argument. For instance, the report on 
Spitsbergen coal, which is discussed in chapter 3, shows how the FRG put emphasis on 
maintaining the "traditional trade relationship" with Norway. In addition, cases such as that of 
the weapons industry cooperation show that the FRG would initiate meetings and business 
agreements. The proactivity shown by Bonn in these instances could be seen as an indication 
that Norway perhaps was more important to the FRG than - the literature suggests. Here, the 
situation is portrayed to be one in which Norway was the only reliant party.  
 
That is not to say that Norway did not need the FRG. It is clear that the Norwegian economic 
policy in many instances based itself on the West German market, as in the case of the 
aluminum smelting program which is mentioned in chapter 3. It is however important to keep 
in mind that in the 1950s and early 1960s, Great Britain was the most important partner to 
Norway. Thus, one could argue that the economic factors which could help motivate and 
drive a reconciliation process were less pronounced in the earliest post war years than they 
were later.  
 
All in all, however, trade relations undoubtedly influenced the political relationship, as both 
countries saw it as beneficial to trade that their negotiations ran smoothly. In the post-World 
War II atmosphere, however, this was at times difficult, and politics would at times hinder 
trade. In spite of these difficulties, trade has been perhaps the most constant factor in the 
Norwegian-German relationship, and one which clearly motivated the governments of both 
countries to make attempts at reconciliation. It is interesting to see how both sides seem to 
have actively used the concept of “relationship” when communicating with each other, almost 
using is as a bargaining chip. This is a clear indicator of the importance of a well functioning 
political relationship to a trade relationship  
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5.1.2 Industrial	  cooperation	  
 
As mentioned, German and Norwegian industry is tied together in a number of ways. The 
shipping industry, as discussed in chapter 3, is a prime example of this: Norwegian ships were 
built in Germany and then helped export German cars. In the 1950s and early 1960s there are 
some examples of such cooperation. The Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol, however, is the first 
coordinated attempt at such cooperation in several industrial and technical areas. It is made 
clear that exchange of ideas and knowledge as well as cooperation on different projects 
benefit both countries. Both Norway and the FRG aimed to expand their industry in order to 
boost their economies, and cooperation no doubt helped achieve those goals. 
 
The industrial cooperation factor is, as mentioned, one which is definitely more pronounced 
in the years after 1965. The reason for this is fairly obvious. Cooperation is difficult to 
achieve if communication between the parties involved is poor. Thus, it was of significant 
importance to the industrial cooperation between Norway and West Germany that the political 
atmosphere improved. On the other hand, it is also possible that those common projects and 
the exchange of knowledge and ideas that already existed helped improve communication and 
trust between the peoples of Norway and the FRG and thus contributed to the positive 
development of the relationship. 
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5.1.3 Exchange	  of	  people	  
 
Knowledge and ideas were not only spread through cooperation within the industrial sector, it 
has also happened through the exchange of people, namely students. Although less popular 
after the war than before, Norwegian students received an education at German universities 
and brought the capital of knowledge home with them, and to some extent vice versa, as well. 
It is difficult to measure the economic advantages to this, but it seems safe to assume such an 
exchange has been beneficial both economically and politically. Economically because well 
educated people typically contribute positively to a country’s economy, and politically 
because the exchange of people no doubt helped reconcile the German and Norwegian people 
to each other. 
 
Another aspect of the exchange of people between Norway and the FRG is tourism. Here, the 
establishment of the Kiel ferry must be mentioned as a factor which has greatly improved the 
possibility of travel between Norway and Germany. Tourists have since traveled back and 
forth between the two, spending money in both countries and thus contributed to the 
economy.  
 
The literature on Norwegian-German economic relations is sparse and is mostly focused on 
how Norway depended on West Germany. There is no denying this fact. However, the 
evidence analyzed in this thesis shows that the situation was more complex than the existing 
literature would suggest. I would argue that a certain level of mutual dependency has always 
existed. Furthermore, it is clear that the difficult political situation troubled both Bonn and 
Oslo early on because of the way this influenced trade negatively. It is therefore clear that 
economic factors have had a strong influence on politics, and vice versa.   
 
5.2 Political	  factors	  
 
Whereas the economic relationship between Norway and the FRG has had a fairly steady 
positive development throughout, with few abrupt interruptions, the political relationship has 
had a clear “before” and “after”. There can be little doubt that the factor which has played the 
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most important part in the reconciliation process is Willy Brandt. However, this thesis argues 
that there are several other factors to take into account.  
 
5.2.1 Foreign	  policy:	  Western	  Europe	  
 
The Cold War clearly brought with it a new set of conditions that both Norway and the FRG 
had to deal with, and NATO acted as a common ground for this. In spite of the common 
enemy, however, Norway and the FRG lead by Konrad Adenauer did not have an abundance 
of coinciding interests politically. Firstly, Adenauer focused almost solely on the European 
integration project. Norway, on the other hand, showed little interest, as Great Britain 
remained unwilling to engage in the 1950s. When Norway did apply for membership in the 
1960s, it was mostly to follow the British lead. In the beginning, the Norwegian attitude was 
that the European integration project did not really concern Norway that much. Rather, it was 
seen as at least a partially good solution to “the German Problem”.   
 
This attitude changed with time, however, and even though it was domestically difficult the 
Norwegian government increased their interest in EC membership. One cannot credit Willy 
Brandt with this development, but rather the British and their change in attitude. Furthermore, 
it became more and more evident to the Norwegian leadership that it would make economic 
sense to take part. Here, West Germany was a part of the motivation. Norway feared they 
would miss out.  
 
As a result of this change in Norwegian attitudes, Norway and the FRG now shared more of a 
common goal, and as previously discussed Bonn showed an active interest in Norway’s 
relationship with the EC. Brandt himself took active part in the discussion in Norway, and the 
issue was a recurring topic in bilateral talks between the two nations.  
 
5.2.2 Foreign	  policy:	  Eastern	  Europe	  
 
Even though the Norwegian government took time to get on board with the European 
integration process the idea was always received with a positive attitude. The same cannot be 
said for Adenauer’s policy towards Eastern Europe. After initial agreement, Oslo grew 
increasingly frustrated with Adenauer’s rigidness. Although Norway never officially broke 
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with the Hallstein Doctrine, it was widely disliked and it was clear that a different approach 
would be preferable to the Norwegian government. An important political factor was thus 
missing from the Norwegian-German relationship in the 1950s and 60s: the two countries did 
not agree on foreign policy. This naturally did not help in the reconciliation process. 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, however, this changed with Willy Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik. His 
“change through rapprochement” –idea coincided with Norwegian values and ideas and 
helped him gain trust and respect. In turn, Brandt won an ally that already had a tradition for 
dialogue with the Eastern bloc. As discussed, Adenauer too had seen the value of this. The 
difference between the two was, however, that Brandt and his government shared certain 
values and ideas with the Norwegian government that Adenauer’s administration did not. 
Evidence discussed in this thesis show that such common values have played an important 
role in the development of the Norwegian-German relationship. 
 
5.2.3 The	  personal	  dimension	  
 
The foreign policies which helped reconcile Norway and Germany were shaped by people in 
government who not only shared a certain outlook, but who also were friendly with each 
other. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the personal dimension has played a significant role 
in the development of the German-Norwegian relationship. In the years up until 1966, few 
such friendly relations existed. There is every reason to believe that this had a negative impact 
on the bilateral relationship, especially when one compares the Norwegian government’s 
relationship with the Adenauer government’s relationship to Brandt’s.  
 
This thesis has discussed several people who have had a particularly strong influence on the 
German-Norwegian government. This is nothing new. On his 23 trips to Norway, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II acquired such a taste for the country that he decided to help rebuild Ålesund after 
the great fire of 1904. Thus, the Kaiser becomes a perfect example of how important personal 
relationships between both countries and people can be. There are several examples of this in 
more recent shared German-Norwegian history. Thanks to their years in Norway, German 
refugees such as Willy Brandt and Max Tau gained both a liking for the country, beneficial 
experiences and close friendships, as did several other state officials in the 1970s especially. 
The telegrams quoted in chapter 4 clearly show how close some of these friendships were.  
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When reading the correspondence between Hans Friedrichs and Bjartmar Gjerde, for 
example, it seems fair to assume that their friendly tone must have helped shape the Gjerde-
Friedrichs protocol that has had such and impact on German-Norwegian economic 
cooperation. One can thus argue that personalities and friendships have been an instrumental 
part of the reconciliation between Norway and the FRG. This factor is particularly interesting 
because it is less rational and a lot more private than the other factors discussed in this thesis. 
Therefore, it is also a lot harder to make specific conclusions about. It does, however, seem 
reasonable to at the very least assume that the close personal relationships policy makers on 
both sides had with each other, as well as a mutual understanding and appreciation for the 
others’ culture and countries, have contributed to a smoother cooperation in all policy areas. 
 
As stated in the introduction, the focus of this thesis has been primarily on state actors. For a 
researcher with more time and resources, it would no doubt be interesting to explore further 
what influence private actors have had on the German-Norwegian relationship. Surely, many 
private companies must have had strong interests in both markets as well as resources and 
connections which would make it possible to influence the governments.  
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6 Sources	  
6.1 Archival	  resources	  
6.1.1 Koblenz	  Endarchiv:	  
 
B 102/263946 Report on negotiations with Norway regarding trade protocols, Dr. Volpp, 
21.09.1961  
 
B 102/26394 Protocol of trade negotiations with Norway, Berlin 14.05.1958, author unknown  
 
B102/288016 Report regarding cooperation between some German and Norwegian 
entrepreneurs, Ministry for Economy, 09.1978 
 
B102/288016 Memorandum on possible copper trade with Norway, Elkem 06.02.1979 
 
6.1.2 Poltisches	  Archiv	  des	  Auswärtiges	  Amt,	  Berlin:	  
 
PAAA 121.624 420/300 note concerning the state visit of Willy Brandt to Oslo, 12.07.1979.. 
author unknown 
 
PAAA 121.625 420/302 Thulin and Rohwedder in report to Gjerde and Friedrichs, 
06.06.1977 
 
PAAA 121.627 420/303 Letter from H.D. Genscher to H.G. Sohl, 11.01.1977 
 
PAAA 121.627 420/303 Dr. Philipp in report to Bonn regarding Norwegian-German industry 
cooperation, 12.01.1979 
 
PAAA 121.625 420/302 Dr. Streitt: Report on the meeting between Hans Friedrichs and 
Bjartmar Gjerde in Bonn, 06.06.1977, 15.06.1977 
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PAAA 121.625 420/302 Hans Friedrichs in letter to Bjartmar Gjerde, 12.05.1977 
 
PAAA B21/728 Suggested answer to question posed by the SPD, 14.09.1966, author 
unknown 
 
PAAA B31/382 Dr. G Ritzel: Letter to das Auswärtige Amt regarding the forthcoming visit 
from the Bundespräsident to Oslo, 27.01.1970 
 
PAAA B31/382 Report regarding the visit of Justice Minister Dr. Dr. Neuberger to Oslo from 
the German Embassy to the Auswärtige Amt, 06.08.1968 
 
PAAA B31/382: Report regarding the visit of Justice Minister Dr. Dr. Neuberger to Oslo 
from the German Embassy to the Auswärtige Amt, 06.08.1968 
 
PAAA B31/382 Report about meeting between Foreign Ministers Stray and Scheel 
10.09.1970 
 
PAAA B31/383 Willy Brandt in telegram to Aase Lange, date unknown 
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